[akerl_]

I touched on this in the parallel comment where you linked this, but worth noting that DNSSEC does not solve this threat model, because re-routing the destination of legitimate IP addresses does not rely on modifying DNS responses.

[cyberax]

It does solve it. Unless you know my private key, you can't fake the DNSSEC signatures. The linking DS records in the TLD are presumably out of your control and in future can be audited through something like Certificate Transparency logs.

So even if you fully control the network path, you will somehow have to get access to my private key material.

[gzread]

Solves part of it. They still control your HTTP and can make LE issue a certificate for you. So actually solves nothing.

Unless you had a CAA record saying only LE certs from your account are valid. And maybe you want that record to be authenticated.

[cyberax]

Agreed. But I meant that in the world without LE but with DNSSEC+DANE this wouldn't be an issue.

[akerl_]

The attacker did not fake any DNS records. They re-routed traffic to the legitimate IP addresses.