[thenewnewguy]

Why dodge the question? Clearly they care today, and I live in today.

If we're doing to defer to industry, does only the opinion of website operators matter, or do browsers and CAs matter too? Browsers and CAs tend to be pretty important and staff big security teams too.

[rstupek]

Are they requiring DNSSEC in order to acquire the certificate? That would be a better indicator to me that it's not security theater=security

[Bender]

Barely 5% of the internet have DNSSEC signed zones and a big chunk of that are handled by CDN's that do the signing automagically for the domain owner as they also host SOA DNS. Mandating DNSSEC would require years of planning and warning those that have not yet set it up and in my opinion DNSSEC tooling should become a better first class citizen in all of the authoritative DNS daemons. as in there should be so many levels of error handling and validation that it would be next to impossible for anyone to break their zones.

So do we wait for all the stragglers? Wait for the top 500 or top 2500 to make it mandatory? Who takes financial responsibility for those that fell through the cracks?

[tptacek]

No CA requires DNSSEC. Obviously they can't: almost nothing is signed. The only change "today" is that technically CAs are now required to honor DNSSEC, where they weren't before.

[rstupek]

I think the fact they don't require it shows it's moribund. If cert providers (or google with their big stick of chrome) specified it is required to have DNSSEC to get a certificate, everyone would jump in line and set it up because there'd be no other choice.

[tptacek]

I agree that not checking it all is an even worse signal. I'm just saying the fact that this is officially enforced only in 2026 is itself a bad signal. At any rate, the CAs you'd have worked with were enforcing DNSSEC this whole time.

[indolering]

Which is really unfortunate, since it's pretty easy to do.

[tptacek]

I agree that it's relatively easy for CAs to validate DNSSEC. I think the fact that they weren't technically required to, despite the sole remaining use case for DNSSEC being to protect against misissuance, is a pretty strong indicator of how cooked DNSSEC is.