[SoftTalker]

The argument seems to be "that landlords are already charging the maximum that tenants are willing to pay for access to a given location and so cannot arbitrarily raise rents when a LVT is imposed."

But, if the tenants now have more money in the form of UBI, then that argument doesn't hold.

[estearum]

No the argument is that the landlord will raise rents, but they will not keep them. The gain generated by UBI, by virtue of raising the value of the land underneath the unit, would be recouped by the LVT at tax time.

UBI is passed from the tenants to the landlord in the form of higher prices, but is recouped by the LVT, which cannot be passed in reverse from the landlord back to the tenant.

[SoftTalker]

I think that when most people hear "the landlord eats it" that does not imply that they raise rents but just pass the increase along to the tax authority and don't keep any of it for themselves. "The landlord eats it" implies that the landlord pays, accepts less profit, and the tenants pay the same as before.

[estearum]

"The landlord eats it" was referring to the tax. That fits with most people's conception of what it means for someone to eat the cost: they cannot bake it into higher prices and pass along the burden.

Separately you are talking about applying UBI. No one said the landlord eats anything as far as UBI.

[iso1631]

Currently landlords charges $15k a year for a property

LVT applies a $10k a year tax on a property

UBI gives everyone $2k a year extra

Landlord can increase rent by $2k a year to $17k, but not by $10k a year

Only way landlord can get back to $10k is to increase density, which increases supply, which introduces price pressure

From a moral point of view it gives every citizen an equal share in the country's land. If they use more than their fair share (a 0.5 acre lot in Manhattan), they pay more. If they use less (a 0.5 acre lot in Minnesota) they pay less.

That dividend could be distributed as increased public services, or lower taxes, or just as a dividend.