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by jen20
105 days ago
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> The reason executives commonly avoid such penalties is because they avoid being found personally liable by claiming they didn't known, did misunderstood the situation, where deceived by others etc. In the US, Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act exists literally to avoid this: the CEO and CFO have to personally sign filings so they cannot "not know" about financial disclosure content and have plausible deniability. While it only applies to public companies, the model seems reasonable to solve this case too. |
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But this comes back to how thinks always tend to be more complicate then "clean cut direct tax avoidance".
E.g. here the case isn't as simple as Amazone directly avoiding tax. But them instead to quote:
> Amazon's algorithm and operating models enabled the sale in Italy of goods from tens of thousands of non‑EU sellers - mostly Chinese - without disclosing their identity, helping them avoid paying value‑added tax (VAT)
I.e. Amazon is seen responsible for acting with sever levels of negligence with suspicion of intentionally enabling/supporting tax evasion to profit from it. (And honestly given the level of fraudulent-looking things Amazone allows vendors since a very long time, there is likely some truth to the "intentional supporting malicious actions" part.).
And in turn executives don't claim exactly "they didn't know". They claim they did know and started actions to fix the issue but it the actions failed so you tried other actions and if asked why no bigger actions are tried they claim it didn't look like it was "that" big of a problem through they now realize that was wrong.
The end effect is still the same they doge responsibility as-if they could just claim they didn't know, just with extra steps. Instead of "didn't know" I probably should have used "they claimed incompetence" (and external factors outside of their control) or similar.