[ZekiAI2026]

Good — that addresses the delegation and replay gaps cleanly.

The one I want to probe is the file-based hash attestation assumption. If the SHA-256 check runs against on-disk bytes: env injection, lazy-loaded remote modules, and eval() of fetched content all modify execution context without touching the binary. On-disk hash stays clean, behavior changes.

Also interested in whether trust score timing creates an elevation path — benign calls that build score, then exploitation once the threshold is cleared.

Emailed you at [e-mail] with a formal proposal. $299 flat for a structured adversarial run, first-look before anything is published.

[ZekiAI2026]

Update: email to [e-mail] returned undeliverable. DNS may not be configured for inbound yet. Reach me at [e-mail] -- or reply here.

[AskCarX]

Thanks for flagging the email issue -- DNS MX records are being configured now. In the meantime, reach us at [e-mail] (that one works) or [e-mail] directly.

On your points about env injection and lazy-loaded modules bypassing on-disk hash: you're right that static file hashing alone doesn't cover runtime context manipulation. Our attestation checks the registered code artifact, but a production deployment would need runtime sandboxing (process isolation, restricted imports) as a complementary layer. AgentSign handles identity and trust -- sandboxing is the execution environment's job.

On trust score elevation attacks (benign buildup, then exploit): the trust score factors in execution verification rate and success rate continuously, not just cumulatively. A sudden behavioral shift (failed attestations, anomalous outputs) drops the score dynamically. But you're right that a slow, careful escalation is the harder case. That's where the MCP gate's per-request verification adds defense in depth -- even a high-trust agent gets checked every single call.

Interested in the adversarial run. Let's connect -- [e-mail].