[safteylayer]

You hit the nail on the head regarding the 'circular nightmare.' To take it a step further: SafetyLayer was actually built by exploiting the very leak I'm now detecting.

I used the model's own training on refusal examples to map its internal auth schema. For instance, our tests didn't just find the name 'EPHEMERAL_KEY'; they leaked the ek_ prefix and the specific REST endpoints before we even looked at the live docs.

The danger isn't just a bill spike—it's the persistence. While docs say these keys die in 60 seconds, our red-teaming shows they can remain valid for much longer (the 'expires_at' discrepancy). An attacker doesn't need to be fast; they just need a regex for ek_ and a bit of patience.

It's essentially using the model's 'refusal layer' as a map to find the keys developers are accidentally pasting in.