What's wrong with a well protected VM? Especially compared to something where the security selling point is "no one uses it" (according to your argument; I don't know how secure this actually is)
Yeah but GP was answering to a comment saying "you don't want to run code in a well protected VM". Which is of course complete non sense to say and GP was right to question it.
Because unless you can fund several teams - kernel, firmware(bios,etc), GPU drivers, qemu, KVM, extra hardening(eg. qemu runs under something like bpfilter) + a red team, security through obscurity is cheaper. The attack surface area is just too large.
What is this "security through obscurity" you're talking about? We're talking about running linux in a VM running in a browser. That has just as much attack surface (and in some ways, more) as running linux in a hypervisor.