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by msdz
108 days ago
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Interesting article you’ve linked. I’m not sure I agree, but it was a good read and food for thought in any case. Work is still being done on how to bulletproof input “sanitization”. Research like [1] is what I love to discover, because it’s genuinely promising. If you can formally separate out the “decider” from the “parser” unit (in this case, by running two models), together with a small allowlisted set of tool calls, it might just be possible to get around the injection risks. [1] Google DeepMind: Defeating Prompt Injections by Design. https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.18813 |
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At a fundamental level, having two contexts as suggested by some of the research in this area isn’t enough; errors or bad LLM judgement can still leak things back and forth between them. We need something like an SQL driver’s injection prevention: when you use it correctly, code/data confusion cannot occur since the two types of information are processed separately at the protocol level.