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by rmasoodx22
99 days ago
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Nice protocol design — the "absence of signature is itself evidence" framing is exactly right.
Oath solves the authorization layer: did a human approve this action before it ran. Titan Gate sits one layer up: did the AI-written code that resulted from those actions get cryptographically receipted before it shipped.
The two compose cleanly. Oath attests the human intent. Titan Gate receipts the code change that follows. Both are needed for a complete audit trail in a SOC2 environment.
Our receipt model: every PR gets HMAC-SHA256 signed, Merkle-ledgered, with SOC2 control mappings (CC6/CC7/CC8) embedded in the receipt JSON. The receipt travels with the code. Verify command:
pip install titan-gate
titan verify receipt.json --key 0dd06d207d711486523b21fe027681d05fc13c10ac313d979fc1e7de657d2447
Live receipt from today: 89bd57ed-b7e1-455a-9f63-5d0005d8d27f
On your protocol design — the namespace:action:scope format looks solid. One edge case worth considering: replay attacks where a valid attestation for action A gets reused for a structurally identical action A'. How are you scoping attestations to a specific execution context rather than just action class?
https://github.com/Rehanrana11/titan-gate |
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