[AgentK20]

How does ECH make it impossible for parents to control their children's access to computers? Sure they can't block sites at the router level, just like your ISP won't be able to block things at the ISP level, but you (the parent) have physical access to the devices in question, and can install client-side software to filter access to the internet.

The only thing this makes impossible is the laziest, and easiest to bypass method of filtering the internet.

[EvanAnderson]

Because there are network operators who have mal-intent increasingly no network operators are permitted to exercise network-level control. A parent who wants to filter the network access in their house is the same as a despotic regime practicing surveillance and censorship on their citizens.

Given that it's pretty much the norm that consumer embedded devices don't respect the owner's wishes network level filtering is the best thing a device owner can do on their own network.

It's a mess.

I'd like to see consumer regulation to force manufacturers to allow owners complete control over their devices. Then we could have client side filtering on the devices we own.

I can't imagine that will happen. I suspect what we'll see, instead, is regulation that further removes owner control of their devices in favor of baking ideas like age or identity verification directly into embedded devices.

Then they'll come for the unrestricted general purpose computers.

[JoshTriplett]

If you have a device you don't trust, don't allow it on your network, or have an isolated network for such devices. Meanwhile, devices are right to not allow MITMing their traffic and to treat that as a security hole, even if a very tiny fraction of their users might want to MITM it to try to do adblocking on a device they don't trust or fully control, rather than to exploit the device and turn it into a botnet.

Along similar lines, a security hole you can use for jailbreaking is also a security hole that could potentially be exploited by malware. As cute as things like "visit this webpage and it'll jailbreak your iPhone" were, it's good that that doesn't work anymore, because that is also a malware vector.

I'd like to see more devices being sold that give the user control, like the newly announced GrapheneOS phones for instance. I look forward to seeing how those are received.

[EvanAnderson]

> If you have a device you don't trust, don't allow it on your network...

That's what I do. That means large swaths of potentially interesting "smart" devices are unavailable to me (since they won't work without Internet access and I'm unable to inspect their traffic). I'm not too heartbroken about it, but it does make me a little sad that I don't get to use some of this "we're living in the future" tech.

> ...devices are right to not allow MITMing their traffic and to treat that as a security hole...

> ...a security hole you can use for jailbreaking is also a security hole that could potentially be exploited by malware...

Yes. Complete agreement. Devices are right not to allow unauthorized parties to MiTM their traffic, tinker w/ their innards, etc. I would never suggest otherwise.

Owners, with physical access, should be permitted to MITM the traffic, tinker with the innards, etc. They're authorized parties.

Device manufacturers should compelled by regulation to allow device owners, with physical access, to examine and manipulate the device internals. I'm thinking of the "developer mode" physical switches on Chromebook devices. If I own it I should have the same access to the device the manufacturer does.

If a manufacturer's business / security model isn't compatible with this regulation the manufacturer should be required to deal with any e-waste concerns and it should clearly be marketed as a rental and not a sale.

None of this will ever happen. I know I'm tiling at windmills. The tech world will continue to get more locked-down, the public will lose unfettered access to general purpose computers, and the personal computer revolution will become a distant memory. We already lost and could never really win because "normies" don't care about this stuff.

[JoshTriplett]

> If a manufacturer's business / security model isn't compatible with this regulation the manufacturer should be required to deal with any e-waste concerns and it should clearly be marketed as a rental and not a sale.

I would be generally in favor of this. I don't like the idea of forbidding building a device that's locked down; there are potential use cases for such a thing. I do like the idea of saying "either allow tinkering or you are subject to numerous other things, like warranty / liability laws".

[ndriscoll]

Network segmentation does nothing for the types of attacks these devices perform (e.g. content recognition for upload to their tracking servers, tracking how you navigate their UI, ad delivery). I'm not worried about them spreading worms on my network. The problem is their propensity to exfiltrate data or relay propaganda. The solution to that is a legal one, or barring that, traffic filtering.

[JoshTriplett]

That was my motivation for the "or" (don't allow it on your network, or put it on an isolated network); it depends on your threat model and what the device could do. Some devices (like "smart" TVs) shouldn't have network access at all.

[ndriscoll]

"Sure, you can use my wifi while you're over. Just enroll in MDM real quick".

As brought up in another thread on the topic, you have things like web browsers embedded in the Spotify app that will happily ignore your policy if you're not doing external filtering.

[AgentK20]

Fair point.

I guess it (network-level filtering) just feels like a dragnet solution that reduces privacy and security for the population at large, when a more targeted and cohesive solution like client-side filtering, having all apps that use web browsers funnel into an OS-level check, etc would accomplish the same goals with improved security.

[ndriscoll]

I think the population at large generally needs to get over their hangups (actually, maybe they have, and it's just techies). No one in a first world country cares if you visit pornhub just like no one cares if you go to amazon. Your ISP has had the ability to see this since the beginning of the web. It does not matter, but we can also have privacy laws restricting their (and everyone else like application/service vendors) ability to record and share that information. If you really want, you can hide it with a VPN or Tor. As long as not everything is opaque, it's easy to block that traffic if you'd like (so e.g. kids can't use it). In a first world country, this works fine since actually no one cares if you're hiding something, so you don't need to blend in. At a societal level, opaque traffic is allowed.

You could have cooperation from everyone to hook into some system (California's solution), which I expect will be a cover for more "we need to block unverified software", or you could allow basic centralized filtering as we've had, and ideally compel commercial OS vendors to make it easy to root and MitM their devices for more effective security.

[iamnothere]

Yes well some of us live in first world countries that are at risk of declining into third world status, where some states DO actually care what sites you visit and would jump at the chance to further restrict traffic.

Rather than “get over” it I think we need to fight. You seem to insist that monitoring/control is a done deal and we only need to argue about the form it takes, but this is not correct. Centralized monitoring/control can be resisted and broken through a combination of political and technical means. While you may not want this, I do. (And many others are being swayed back in my direction as they start to feel the effects of service enshittification, censorship under the guise of “fighting misinformation”, and media consolidation.)

[ndriscoll]

I think you misunderstand what I mean by "centralized". I mean e.g. at your gateway/firewall/router. As in a single place for you to enforce policy on your network.

At least in the US, what happens outside of your network is mostly irrelevant (except perhaps that free, open wifi should be liable for any lack of filtering). Centralized (as in e.g. government) control is non-existent, and centralized monitoring is easily defeated if you'd like with a variety of methods (though like I said we could have laws against the monitoring).

[Bjartr]

There's nothing technical stopping device manufacturers from making this easy for parents to do. They choose not to.

[hnav]

A lot of endpoint protection products rely on SNI sniffing. E.g. Apple's network extensions filters look at TLS handshakes.

[afiori]

Then they would drop the connection with esni