[toomuchtodo]

The credential is of questionable value, it’s a checkbox to enable international folks to buy their way in via educational visas and to soak US students for student loan debt that can’t be discharged. It’s gating economic outcomes, not an objective measure.

[testbjjl]

What? Somehow I think you’re overthinking this. There is no conspiracy. International students have helped to get us to where we are. Could we use some course corrections, sure, but you’re throwing the baby out with the bath water. Don’t believe me, ask the CEO of your company, or any Fortune 500, or your stock portfolio about the need to have the best talent in the U.S.

[toomuchtodo]

You said it right there: the only people it’s important to are corporations and the stock market. Do I care if those gains are not realized because immigrants cannot be used for this use case? I do not. Their incentives (line go up) are not my incentives.

[testbjjl]

It why, if you have a job, have a job. Good luck with the wind powered vegetable farm. Hope you or anyone you care about need any advanced sciences.

[toomuchtodo]

We’ll be fine with China developing the sciences and technology the world will rely on, they lead in the vast majority of frontier fields. I’m more likely to see quality of life improvements through China’s efforts versus that of the US. They are focused on outcomes and state capacity, not shareholder returns (as the US is).

If you want the world to be wealthy in consumer excess and quality of life, China is the path to success, not the US. Whether the US succeeds or not is irrelevant unless you are very wealthy as an owner of capital. The innovation will happen regardless (most likely in China, but also potentially Europe, Canada, and other developed countries).

https://www.aspi.org.au/report/aspis-two-decade-critical-tec (August 2024)

> Now covering 64 critical technologies and crucial fields spanning defence, space, energy, the environment, artificial intelligence (AI), biotechnology, robotics, cyber, computing, advanced materials and key quantum technology areas, the Tech Tracker’s dataset has been expanded and updated from five years of data (previously, 2018–2022) to 21 years of data (2003–2023).

> These new results reveal the stunning shift in research leadership over the past two decades towards large economies in the Indo-Pacific, led by China’s exceptional gains. The US led in 60 of 64 technologies in the five years from 2003 to 2007, but in the most recent five years (2019–2023) is leading in seven. China led in just three of 64 technologies in 2003–2007 but is now the lead country in 57 of 64 technologies in 2019–2023, increasing its lead from our rankings last year (2018–2022), where it was leading in 52 technologies.

https://www.aspi.org.au/report/critical-technology-tracker (March 2023)

> Our research reveals that China has built the foundations to position itself as the world’s leading science and technology superpower, by establishing a sometimes stunning lead in high-impact research across the majority of critical and emerging technology domains.

> China’s global lead extends to 37 out of 44 technologies that ASPI is now tracking, covering a range of crucial technology fields spanning defence, space, robotics, energy, the environment, biotechnology, artificial intelligence (AI), advanced materials and key quantum technology areas. The Critical Technology Tracker shows that, for some technologies, all of the world’s top 10 leading research institutions are based in China and are collectively generating nine times more high-impact research papers than the second-ranked country (most often the US). Notably, the Chinese Academy of Sciences ranks highly (and often first or second) across many of the 44 technologies included in the Critical Technology Tracker. We also see China’s efforts being bolstered through talent and knowledge import: one-fifth of its high-impact papers are being authored by researchers with postgraduate training in a Five-Eyes country. China’s lead is the product of deliberate design and long-term policy planning, as repeatedly outlined by Xi Jinping and his predecessors.