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by A_D_E_P_T
106 days ago
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The question presupposes that "the experience of the color blue" is a discrete object that needs a storage location. But that's the dualist picture in disguise. On a functionalist view, blueness isn't stored; it's what certain neural activity constitutively is when you're that system observing that blue. As an aside, isn't it more weird that violet and purple look indistinguishable despite being physically so different? It's said that this is because our L-cones (red-sensitive) have a secondary sensitivity peak at short wavelengths. So violet light triggers S-cones + a bit of L-cone. Purple light (red + blue) also triggers S-cones + L-cones. Similar activation pattern = same quale. It's all functional/physical. Read Tom Cuda "Against Neural Chauvinism." Also Daniel Dennett. |
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Why should there be anything a certain neural activity is when making an observation? This is adding something additional to functionalism. You're just sneaking the hard problem back into the picture without realizing it.