[goatlover]

The article asks the same question in the last part, wondering whether it's just randomly selected. MWI proponents have always argued decoherence leads to the entire world being put into superposition as decoherence just spreads entanglement to the environment. The math never says entanglement destroys superposition beyond a certain point of complexity (many different entangled systems forming the environment).

The author does say the approach is a combination of Copenhagen and MWI, removing the outlandish parts of both. Seems to preserve the randomness of the former though.

[Joker_vD]

> MWI proponents have always argued decoherence leads to the entire world being put into superposition as decoherence just spreads entanglement to the environment.

Well, duh. It's not like classic objects actually exist, or the classical/quantum divide: everything is quantum, including the "observers". The "classical observer" is a crude approximation that breaks down to a pointy enough question. Just like shorting the perfect battery (with zero internal resistance) with a perfect wire (with zero external resistance) — this scenario is not an approximation of any possible real scenario so it's paradoxicality (infinite current!) is irrelevant.

[flockonus]

Random is a very interesting concept. In relation to nature we seem to use "random" as anything we can't or are currently unable to model.

To call something random doesn't mean it's impossible to model, in fact all sorts of natural facts seemed random one day before being covered by a model. One very relatable example example is the motion of stars in the the night sky, which seemed random for ages, until the Copernican revolution.

The fact we have access to random() function in programming seems to trip many people. random() is a particular model implementation of random, but stuff in nature isn't random().

My point is, using "just random" to do work in any scientific explanation is a clutch.

[Maxatar]

In science randomness is usually used to abstract over a large number of possible paths that result in some outcome without having to reason individually about any specific path or all such paths.

It does not have to mean something inherently non-deterministic or something that can't be modelled, although it certainly is the case that if something is inherently non-deterministic then it would necessarily have to be modelled randomly. Modelling things as a random process is very useful even in cases where the underlying phenomenon has a fully understood and deterministic model; a simple example of this would be chess. It's an entirely deterministic game with perfect information that is fully understood, but nevertheless all the best chess engines model positions probabilistically and use randomness as part of their search.

[srean]

> Modelling things as a random process is very useful even in cases where the underlying phenomenon has a fully understood and deterministic model

Output of of a pseudorandom generater is a good example.

[staticassertion]

There's disagreement on this. You seem to just be saying that brute facts or brute contingencies don't exist, but I suspect most scientists would disagree with that.

[Nevermark]

I am not sure why you are being downvoted.

The use of "random" as explanation or characterization in science has certainly spanned everything from "we don't know", to "there is inherent indivisible physical randomness".

And I would agree, in the latter case it is a crutch. A postulate that something gets decided by no mechanisms whatsoever (randomness obeying a distribution still leaves the unexplained "choice").

It is remarkable that people still suggest the latter, when the theory, both in theory and experiment, doesn't require a physical choice at all (even if we experience a choice, that experience is explained without the universe making a choice).

[anon291]

I'm not sure that's true. Randomness has a well-defined meaning for me: unable to be computed by a finite program. The vast majority of real numbers are thus composed of truly random digits. Suppose the universe has a constant that is a real number. The overwhelmingly vast majority of real numbers are non-computable and cannot be described by a finite descrition of any kind. Thus, if the universe were simply sampling numbers from this real constant (or simply the answer to the math is this real constant as it is undergoing some dynamics), then the numbers would appear random because the true underlying constant is non-computable, and thus appears random.

There is no possible finite way to describe if this were the case or not.

[staticassertion]

It is not incomplete to say that something does not require explanation, nor is it saying it's "magic". It is a cost that your model might incur, that's it.

https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.15776

In this paper a plurality of physicists stated that they felt that the initial conditions of the universe are brute facts that warrant no further explanation. This is not "our model doesn't yet account for it", it's "there is no explanation to be given".

[Nevermark]

A model is incomplete if it doesn't explain something.

That doesn't make a model wrong. All models we have are partial explanations.

But that doesn't make it rational to claim that an incomplete model is complete. Or to treat unexplained specifics as inherently "just so", without cause or reason (i.e. magic), and we must just accept them as unexplainable instead of pursuing them with further inquiry.

[staticassertion]

> A model is incomplete if it doesn't explain something.

I've just explained that this is not strictly true. I don't know what else to say. Brute contingencies, by definition, do not require explanation. I then gave you a paper where scientists largely believe in brute contingencies.

I think if you want to know more you can look into this. Just look for topics about brute facts and brute contingencies.

If you want to deny that brute contingencies are possible, by all means. That's a totally valid view. Just understand that it's probably not the majority view among scientists and that you aren't necessarily "right" (just as those who hold to brute contingencies aren't necessarily "right").

[Nevermark]

Constraint without an actual constraint? I am not denying it, it denies itself. It isn’t coherent.

Things are what they are because of constraints. Which is more general, and assumes less, than appeals to causes.

Constraints need not be prior. They can can be simultaneous, i.e. co-constraints. And they can be internal to the whole, i.e. all of reality can be a co-constrained structure without external constraint.

An ultimate law of conservation is a strong candidate for a self-constrained reality. All versions of forms existing that neither locally create nor destroy. And since all possible forms within that exist, no choices made universally and there are no conserving forms it excludes. A coherent, infinite, unique, zero information structure. (Uniqueness is inherent to a zero information structure. Non-uniqueness necessitates choice.)

But claiming that some things just are, with no structural necessity, is an appeal to magic. A specific, with no actual constraint matching the specificity isn’t coherent.

You don’t get something for nothing. There is no outside of reality to provide that.

Any “outside” just means that total reality was not being included in the analysis.

I am not saying we can practically figure everything out. Or that there may not be questions, that given the limited resources/laws of our universe may not be answerable from our position, even theoretically. There may be questions we can’t answer. But nothing specific “appears” with some magical independence from the rest of reality.

That is the non-taulogy of it “just is”.

It would also make reality as a whole irrational. Not even a structure that obeys a conservation law. Because it would have specifics that had no reason.

[qsera]

Random events are those events who's occurrences will not prevent consciousness that observes it from existing.

No one is deciding anything.