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by iggldiggl
117 days ago
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> What most of these people do not seem to get is that proper sandboxing does not only protect against attacks from the inside (rogue developer, supply chain attack), but also from the outside. The problem is that strict file system sandboxing in particular also breaks a substantial number of workflows that can't be modelled as 'only ever open the exact file the user explicitly' picked. (Any multi-file file formats are particularly affected, as well as any UI workflows that don't integrate well with strictly having to use the OS file picker.) So you need some escape hatch for optionally allowing access to larger swathes of the file system, or even really everything as before, but that in turn then risks being abused again by malicious actors. And then…? Plus things like Android's implementation initially using an API completely incompatible with classical file APIs, as well as causing some noticeable performance overhead even today if you need more than simply accessing the occasional single file here and there. |
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For example, it’s useful for a music player with metadata editing features to have read/write access to the whole filesystem, but that constitutes a significant risk since all we can do is wholesale allow or prevent access to the whole filesystem. What if the system could allow it to access only music files, though? That’d scope the risk back down to almost nothing while also allowing the music player to do its job.
This is the kind of thing I’ve been getting at in the other replies. Nobody has really sat down and given system level security controls a deep rethink.