[Lichtso]

> I Think that DoS needs to stop being considered a vulnerability

Strongly disagree. While it might not matter much in some / even many domains, it absolutely can be mission critical. Examples are: Guidance and control systems in vehicles and airplanes, industrial processes which need to run uninterrupted, critical infrastructure and medicine / health care.

[technion]

These redos vulnerabilities always come down to "requires a user input of unbounded length to be passed to a vulnerable regex in JavaScript ". If someone is building a hard real time air plane guidance system they are already not doing this.

I can produce a web server that prints hello world and if you send it enough traffic it will crash. If can put user input into a regex and the response time might go up by 1ms and noone will say its suddenly a valid cve.

Then someone will demonstrate that with a 1mb input string it takes 4ms to respond and claim they've learnt a cve for it. I disagree. If you simply use Web pack youve probably seen a dozen of these where the vulnerable input was inside the Web pack.config.json file. The whole category should go in the bin.

[bandrami]

> If someone is building a hard real time air plane guidance system they are already not doing this.

But if we no longer classed DOSes as vulnerabilities they might

[bregma]

These are functional safety problems, not security vulnerabilities.

For a product that requires functional safety, CVEs are almost entirely a marketing tool and irrelevant to the technology. Go ahead and classify them as CVEs, it means the sales people can schmooze with their customer purchasing department folks more but it's not going to affect making your airplane fly or you car drive or your cancer treatment treat any more safely.

[staticassertion]

I think this is just sort of the wrong framing. Yes, a plane having a DoS is a critical failure. But it's critical at the level where you're considering broader scopes than just the impact of a local bug. I don't think this framing makes any sense for the CVE system. If you're building a plane, who cares about DoS being a CVE? You're way past CVEs. When you're in "DoS is a security/ major boundary" then you're already at the point where CVSS etc are totally irrelevant.

CVEs are helpful for describing the local property of a vulnerability. DOS just isn't interesting in that regard because it's only a security property if you have a very specific threat model, and your threat model isn't that localized (because it's your threat model). That's totally different from RCE, which is virtually always a security property regardless of threat model (unless your system is, say, "aws lambda" where that's the whole point). It's just a total reversal.

[1718627440]

If availability is a security concern, than yes DoS is a security concern, but only in so far as all other bugs that limit availability are too. It is not a security concern per se, regardless of whether availability is a security concern. We don't treat every bug as a security issue.

Well, the Linux Kernel project actually does.

[staticassertion]

The linux kernel does the opposite, they do not believe in security vulnerabilities. That's why if you mention "security" in a patch, Linus will reject it.

[clickety_clack]

I just hate being flagged for rubbish in Vanta that is going to cause us the most minor possible issue with our clients because there’s a slight risk they might not be able to access the site for a couple of hours.