[delichon]

> Clearly, these insiders have figured out a way to cash in on information. Whether that's kosher is out-of-scope here

To the extent that the value of prediction markets is in their power to predict, insider trading is kosher. Wholesome even.

[tedsanders]

Bribing employees to disclose confidential information entrusted to them is not kosher nor wholesome. I consider corporate insider trading on these markets to be analogous - if you're an employee and you trade, you are selling your employer's info for money. Nearly every employer would fire employees caught giving away confidential information for personal bribes.

In the stock market, Matt Levine likes to say that insider training is about theft, not fairness. You can be prosecuted for merely sharing info with a friend on a golf course who then proceeds to trade. Your crime is not trading (you didn't even trade), but misappropriating information you were entrusted with and not authorized to sell.

[pousada]

The market economy is not about fairness but about ruthless power.

The worlds most influential people demonstrate that only power matters; that the world order we built last century through unimaginable suffering and violence matters less than securing their own personal gain; that law, morals, and order were just dreams of the weak

[PollardsRho]

What about bets without insider participation, where you want the market to function as an aggregator of educated guesses? OP has one reaction to insider trading, but I imagine a very common alternative would be "those insiders make their money off of bettors like me, I shouldn't participate." Some questions are clearly insider-proof, but I imagine many questions have insiders who don't bet on Polymarket. If Polymarket is going to be a good prediction market, surely it should incentivize people to make predictions on those questions too?

[empath75]

It's not that it's cheating _in the market_, but if people have an obligation to their employers, etc, to keep information confidential, then they are stealing from their employer by cashing in on it, as sure as if they had taken money from the till.

[moduspol]

Indeed. For those of us not gambling, it's really quite beneficial.

[kibwen]

Prediction markets can only pay out based on public information, which means that prediction markets can only "reveal information" like this for things that would have been public knowledge anyway. And insiders are always risking that leaking their insider info might influence the outcome of the bet against them (like if leaking the date of a covert military operation causes the operation to be rescheduled), so they're financially incentivized to wait as long as possible before tacitly revealing that information. So prediction markets are the worst possible way of revealing hidden information: you will only learn about things you would have already known, and only when it's too late to make any use of that knowledge.

[smcin]

You're overlooking that sudden, unexplained or counterintuitive movements in the actual prediction market itself, well before the event occurs/market resolves can themselves convey information, about what apparent insiders think (or whales want to manipulate the market to think).

Obvious example: Polymarket now has 69(!) markets involving Iran: https://polymarket.com/predictions/iran

Consider the timing of those markets wrt 2026 national elections in US, Israel, also Sweden, legislative elections in France, Germany (as canaries for their next general elections) plus a possible change in UK PM, plus any possible Ukraine or Venezuela outcomes. And of course events in the stock market or energy markets make certain outcomes more/less likely.

Also, on Polymarket traders often buy and sell before a market resolves, to exploit patterns in other traders.

And consider what happens at major media e.g. CNN now they've partnered with Kalshi, wrt whether the broadcasting certain predictions/viewpoints/interviewees get boosted/suppressed.

[kibwen]

> movements in the actual prediction market itself, well before the event occurs/market resolves can themselves convey information, about what apparent insiders think (or whales want to manipulate the market to think)

Yes, and surely you see that the inability to distinguish between true signal and deliberate countersignal until after the bet has resolved is an indictment of the very model of predictions markets. Like a qubit, you must collapse the waveform to extract the information.

[smcin]

If you can see which account placed key trades, you can determine if it's likely to be signal/countersignal/neither.

Certainly the platform itself can.

[freejazz]

>Obvious example: Polymarket now has 69(!) markets involving Iran: https://polymarket.com/predictions/iran

You have not conveyed what information is thought by insiders in your example

[moduspol]

There's also a financial incentive to get your bets in early, while the odds are still in your favor. The longer you wait, the higher the risk that your secret becomes public knowledge.

I agree it's not perfect, but I think you're underplaying a lot of the value.