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> Oh, I don't know, maybe dynamic code loading or secure sandboxing of code? For instance you can compile a custom Google Go without disk IO, but you can't have an app that loads plugins much less one where the app can do IO but the plugin can't. Sure you can. Spawn a child process with lower security privileges, and communicate over a pipe. It might require you to restructure to reduce chattiness, but on the other hand, you will be much less likely to expose yourself to security vulnerabilities than the Java "sandbox". If the child process is written in Go, you can even use the -u compiler flag to only allow safe packages (i.e. no assembly, C, only packages explicitly marked as safe and pure Go). You can go even further, and mark package os unsafe, disallowing file system access altogether. Or do what (I suspect) Appengine does, and provide your own neutered implementation of package os/time/net/etc, and mark those as safe. The Go playground is an example of this, btw. It merely streams stdout and stderr, but you could imagine doing other things with the sandboxed program. > I think Google Go advocates put blinders on like agentS because if they actually objectively looked at the situation they would have the same thing to say as others do about Google Go: "meh". I think you are falling prey to the same fallacy of false cause as your GP. "agentS likes Go, so he must not be objectively looking at the language". It is possible to objectively look at the language, and think it useful. |
This is exactly what I was talking about. You can't even admit facts like that Java has dynamic loading and a security model and that Google Go does not. You're simply delusional in this respect.