[mrob]

The copy was brought into existence without its consent. This isn't the same as normal reproduction because babies are not born with human sapience, and as a society we collectively agree that children do not have full human rights. IMO, copying a consciousness is worse than murder because the victimization is ongoing. It doesn't matter if the original consents because the copy is not the original.

[lxgr]

> This isn't the same as normal reproduction because babies are not born with human sapience

So you're fine with cloning consciousness as long as it initially runs sufficiently glitchy?

[mrob]

If a "cloned" consciousness has no memories, and a unique personality, and no awareness of any previous activity, how is it a clone? That's going well beyond merely glitchy. In that case the main concern would be the possibility of slavery as Ar-Curunir mentioned.

[lxgr]

> how is it a clone?

That's my point exactly: I don't see what makes clones any more or less deserving of ethical consideration than any other sentient beings brought into existence consciously.

[mrob]

My whole argument assumes that the clones are equally deserving of ethical consideration.

[brazzy]

> The copy was brought into existence without its consent. This isn't the same as normal reproduction because babies are not born with human sapience, and as a society we collectively agree that children do not have full human rights.

That is a reasonable argument for why it's not the same. But it is no argument at all for why being brought into existence without one's consent is a violation of bodily autonomy, let alone a particularly bad one - especially given that the copy would, at the moment its existence begin, identical to the original, who just gave consent.

If anything, it is very, very obviously a much smaller violation of consent then conceiving a child.

[mrob]

The original only consents for itself. It doesn't matter if the copy is coerced into sharing the experience of giving that consent, it didn't actually consent. Unlike a baby, all its memories are known to a third party with the maximum fidelity possible. Unlike a baby, everything it believes it accomplished was really done by another person. When the copy understands what happened it will realize it's a victim of horrifying psychological torture. Copying a consciousness is obviously evil and aw124 is correct.

[lxgr]

I feel like the only argument you're successfully making is that you would find it inevitably evil/immoral to be a cloned consciousness. I don't see how that automatically follows for the rest of humanity.

Sure, there are astronomical ethical risks and we might be better off not doing it, but I think your arguments are losing that nuance, and I think it's important to discuss the matter accurately.

[mrob]

This entire HN discussion is proof that some people would not personally have a problem with being cloned, but that does not entitle them to create clones. The clone is not the same person. It will inevitably deviate from the original simply because it's impossible to expose it to exactly the same environment and experiences. The clone has the right to change its mind about the ethics of cloning.

[lxgr]

> that does not entitle them to create clones

It does indeed not, unless they can at least ensure their wellbeing and their ethical treatment, at least in my view (assuming they are indeed conscious, and we might have to just assume so, absent conclusive evidence to the contrary).

> The clone has the right to change its mind about the ethics of cloning.

Yes, but that does not retroactively make cloning automatically unethical, no? Otherwise, giving birth to a child would also be considered categorically unethical in most frameworks, given the known and not insignificant risk that they might not enjoy being alive or change their mind on the matter.

That said, I'm aware that some of the more extreme antinatalist positions are claiming this or something similar; out of curiosity, are you too?

[mrob]

>retroactively make cloning automatically unethical

There's nothing retroactive about it. The clone is harmed merely by being brought into existence, because it's robbed of the possibility of having its own identity. The harm occurs regardless of whether the clone actually does change its mind. The idea that somebody can be harmed without feeling harmed is not an unusual idea. E.g. we do not permit consensual murder ("dueling").

>antinatalist positions

I'm aware of the anti-natalist position, and it's not entirely without merit. I'm not 100% certain that having babies is ethical. But I already mentioned several differences between consciousness cloning and traditional reproduction in this discussion. The ethical risk is much lower.

[ben_w]

> The clone is not the same person.

Then it wasn't a good attempt at making a mind clone.

I suspect this will actually be the case, which is why I oppose it, but you do actually have to start from the position that the clone is immediately divergent to get to your conclusions; to the extent that the people you're arguing with are correct (about this future tech hypothetical we're not really ready to guess about) that the clone is actually at the moment of their creation identical in all important ways to the original, then if the original was consenting the clone must also be consenting:

Because if the clone didn't start off consenting to being cloned when the original did, it's necessarily the case that the brain cloning process was not accurate.

> It will inevitably deviate from the original simply because it's impossible to expose it to exactly the same environment and experiences.

And?

[lxgr]

> you do actually have to start from the position that the clone is immediately divergent to get to your conclusions

Eventual divergence seems to be enough, and I don't think this requires any particularly strong assumptions.

[mrob]

>Because if the clone didn't start off consenting to being cloned when the original did, it's necessarily the case that the brain cloning process was not accurate.

This is false. The clone is necessarily a different person, because consciousness requires a physical substrate. Its memories of consenting are not its own memories. It did not actually consent.

[brazzy]

You are making a bunch of unfounded assetions, not arguments.

[aeve890]

>The copy was brought into existence without its consent

This may surprise you but EVERYONE is brought into existence without consent. At least the pre-copy state of the copy agreed to be copied.

[mrob]

It obviously doesn't surprise me because I specifically mentioned babies.

[lxgr]

I'd also be interested in your moral distinction between having children and cloning consciousness (in particular in a world where the latter doesn't result in inevitable exploitation, a loss of human rights etc.) then.

[Ar-Curunir]

Typically, real humans have some agency on their own existence.

A simulated human is entirely at the mercy of the simulator; it is essentially a slave. As a society, we have decided that slavery is illegal for real humans; what would distinguish simulated humans from that?