If what they do is "well described by a bunch of math", they're making calculations.
Unless the substrate is essential and irreducible to get the output (whic is not if what they do is "well described by a bunch of math"), then the material or process (neurons or water pipes or billiard balls or 0s and 1s in a cpu) doesn't matter.
>You've got the direction of the arrow backwards. Map, territory, etc.
The whole point is that at the level we're interested in regarding "what is the process that creates thought/consciousness", the territory is not important: the mechanism is, not the material of the mechanism.
That morality requires consciousness is a popular belief today, but not universal. Read Konrad Lorenz (Das sogenannte Böse) for an alternative perspective.
That we have consciousness as some kind of special property, and it's not just an artifact of our brain basic lower-level calculations, is also not very convincing to begin with.
In a trivial sense, any special property can be incorporated into a more comprehensive rule set, which one may choose to call "physics" is one so desires; but that's just Hempel's dilemma.
To object more directly, I would say that people who call the hard problem of consciousness hard would disagree with your statement.
People who call "the hard problem of consciousness hard" use circular logic (notice the two "hards" in the phrase).
People who merely call "the problem of consciousness hard" don't have some special mechanism to justify that over what we know, which is as emergent property of meat-algorithmic calcuations.
Except Penrose, who hand-waves some special physics.
[0] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s_4J4uor3JE