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by bawolff
134 days ago
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As a general rule in cryptography, a lot of vulnerabilities relate confusing the system by using a correct thing in the wrong context. Making it a rule that you have to use separate chains for separate purposes is a good rule from a general design standpoint. |
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No it's not. It's a specific argument, that's true only in specific cases. You shouldn't handle knives, is equally a good rule from a general design standpoint. But nonsensical when you're a chef.
You should have separate chains is a reasonable decision when the ability to rotate out a compromised chain, and insulate some downtime, from other chains/usages is desirable. Needing to manage multiple cert chains is more overhead. Making use or maintenance harder. It increases complexity.
Large companies have never been afraid of more overhead. It's their singular advantage.
Removing features someone is using, and calling it better security, when it doesn't actually meaningfully reduce or remove some risk is weaponized incompetence. And sufficiently advanced incompetence, is....
There's no world where anyone gains additional protection, from a 3rd party compromise. Or one where LE has one of chains compromised, but doesn't rotate all of them.