[TeMPOraL]

> What's the equivalent of thinking users are this stupid?

What's the equivalent of thinking security aficionados are clueless?

Security advice is dumb and detached from life, and puts ubdue burden on people that's not like anything else in life.

Sharing passwords is a feature, or rather a workaround because this industry doesn't recognize the concept of temporary delegation of authority, even though it's the basics of everyday life and work. That's what you do when you e.g. send your kid on a grocery run with your credit card.

Asking users to keep their 2FA recovery keys or disk encryption keys safe on their own - that's beyond ridiculous. Nothing else in life works that way. Not your government ID, not your bank account, not your password, not even the nuclear launch codes. Everything people are used to is fixable; there's always a recovery path for losing access to accounts or data. It may take time and might involve paying a notary or a court case, but there is always a way. But not so with encryption keys to your shitposts and vacation pictures in the cloud.

Why would you expect people to follow security advice correctly? It's detached from reality, dumb, and as Bitcoin showed, even having millions of dollars on the line doesn't make regular people capable of being responsible with encryption keys.

[dijit]

Your credit card analogy is doing a lot of heavy lifting here, but it's carrying the wrong cargo. Sending your kid to the shops with your card is temporary delegation, not permanent key escrow to a third party you don't control. It's the difference between lending someone your house key for the weekend and posting a copy to the council "just in case you lose yours". And; you know that you've done it, you have personally weighed the risks and if something happens with your card/key in that window: you can hold them to account. (granted, keys can be copied)

> Nothing else in life works that way. Not your government ID, not your bank account, not your password, not even the nuclear launch codes.

Brilliant examples of why you're wrong:

Government IDs have recovery because the government is the trusted authority that verified you exist in the first place. Microsoft didn't issue your birth certificate.

Nuclear launch codes are literally designed around not giving any single entity complete access, hence the two-person rule and multiple independent key holders. You've just argued for my position.

Banks can reset your PIN because they're heavily regulated entities with legal obligations and actual consequences for breaching trust. Microsoft's legal department is larger than most countries' regulators.

> even having millions of dollars on the line doesn't make regular people capable of being responsible with encryption keys.

Right, so the solution is clearly to hand those keys to a corporation that's subject to government data requests, has been breached multiple times, and whose interests fundamentally don't align with yours? The problem with Bitcoin isn't that keys are hard - it's that the UX is atrocious. The solution is better tooling, not surveillance capitalism with extra steps.

You're not arguing for usability. You're arguing that we should trust a massive corporation more than we trust ourselves, whilst simultaneously claiming users are too thick to keep a recovery key in a drawer. Pick a lane.

[pohuing]

Let's be serious for a second and consider what's more useful based on the likelihood of these things actually happening.

You're saying it's likely to happen that a laptop thief also is capable to stealing the recovery key from Microsoft'servers?

So therefore it would be better that users lost all their data if - an update bungles the tpm trust - their laptop dies and they extract the hard drive - they try to install another OS alongside but fuck up the tpm trust along the way - they have to replace a Mainboard - they want to upgrade their pc ?

I know for a fact which has happened to me more often.

[dijit]

You've listed five scenarios where local recovery would help and concluded that cloud escrow is therefore necessary. The thing is every single one of those scenarios is solved by a local backup of your recovery key, not by uploading it to Microsoft's servers.

The question isn't "cloud escrow vs nothing". It's "cloud escrow vs local backup". One protects you from hardware failure. The other protects you from hardware failure whilst also making you vulnerable to data breaches, government requests, and corporate policy changes you have zero control over.

You've solved a technical problem by creating a political one. Great.

[TeMPOraL]

> Sending your kid to the shops with your card is temporary delegation, not permanent key escrow to a third party you don't control. It's the difference between lending someone your house key for the weekend and posting a copy to the council "just in case you lose yours".

Okay, then take sharing your PINs with your spouse. Or for that matter, account passwords or phone unlock patterns. It's a perfectly normal thing that many people (including myself) do, because it enables ad-hoc delegation. "Honey, can you copy those photos to my laptop and send them to godparents?", asks my wife as she hands me her phone and runs to help our daughter with something - implicitly trusting me with access to her phone, thumbdrive, Windows account, e-mail account, and WhatsApp/Messenger accounts.

This kind of ad-hoc requests happen for us regularly, in both directions, without giving it much of a thought[0]. It's common between couples, variants of that are also common within family (e.g. grandparents delegating most of computer stuff to their adult kids on an ad-hoc basis), and variants of that also happen regularly in workplaces[1], despite the whole corporate and legal bureaucracy trying its best to prevent it[2].

> Government IDs have recovery because the government is the trusted authority that verified you exist in the first place. Microsoft didn't issue your birth certificate.

But Microsoft issued your copy of Windows and Bitlocker and is the one responsible for your data getting encrypted. It's obvious for people to seek recourse with them. This is how it works in every industry other than tech, which is why I'm a supporter of governments actually regulating in requirements for tech companies to offer proper customer support, and stop with the "screw up managing 2FA recovery keys, lose your account forever" bullshit.

> Banks can reset your PIN because they're heavily regulated entities with legal obligations and actual consequences for breaching trust.

As it should be. As it works everywhere, except tech, and especially except in the minds of security aficionados.

> Nuclear launch codes are literally designed around not giving any single entity complete access, hence the two-person rule and multiple independent key holders.

Point being, if enough right people want the nukes to be launched, the nukes will be launched. This is about the highest degree of responsibility on the planet, and relevant systems do not have the property of "lose the encryption key we told you 5 years ago to write down, and it's mathematically proven that no one can ever access the system anymore". It would be stupid to demand that.

That's the difference between infosec industry and real life: in real life, there is always a way to recover. Infosec is trying to normalize data and access being fundamentally unrecoverable after even a slightest fuckup, which is a degree of risk individuals and society have not internalized yet, and are not equipped to handle.

> Right, so the solution is clearly to hand those keys to a corporation that's subject to government data requests, has been breached multiple times, and whose interests fundamentally don't align with yours?

Yes. For normal people, Microsoft is not a threat actor here. Nor is the government. Microsoft is offering a feature that keeps your data safe from thieves and stalkers (and arguably even organized crime), but that doesn't require you to suddenly treat your laptop with more care than you treat your government ID. They can do this, because for users of this feature, Microsoft is a trusted party.

Ultimately, that's what security aficionados and cryptocurrency people don't get: the world runs on trust. Trust is a feature.

--

[0] - Though less and less of that because everyone and their dog now wants to require 2FA for everything. Instead of getting the hint that passwords are not meant to identify a specific individual, they're doubling down and tying every other operation to a mobile phone, so delegating desktop operations often requires handing over your phone as well, defeating the whole point. This is precisely what I mean by the industry not recognizing or supporting the concept of delegation of authority.

[1] - The infamous practice of writing passwords on post-it notes isn't just because of onerous password requirements, it's also a way to facilitate temporary delegation of authority. "Can you do X for me? Password is on a post-it in the top drawer."

[2] - GDPR or not, I still heard from doctors I know personally that sharing passwords to access patient data is common, and so is bringing some of it back home on a thumb drive, to do some work after hours. On the one hand, this creates some privacy risks for patient (and legal risk for hospitals) - but on the other hand, these doctors don't do it because they hate GDPR or their patients. They do it because it's the only way they can actually do their jobs effectively. If rules were actually enforced to prevent it, people would die. This is what I mean when I say that security advice is often dumb and out of touch with reality, and ignored for very good reasons.

[dijit]

Your entire argument rests on conflating "trust" with "blind dependency on a third party subject to legal compulsion".

> Okay, then take sharing your PINs with your spouse.

Sharing with your spouse is consensual, temporary, and revocable. You know you've done it, you trust that specific person, and you can change it later. Uploading your keys to Microsoft is none of these things.

> But Microsoft issued your copy of Windows and Bitlocker and is the one responsible for your data getting encrypted.

Microsoft sold you software. They didn't verify your identity, they're not a regulated financial institution, and they have no duty of care beyond their terms of service. The fact that they encrypted your drive doesn't make them a trustworthy custodian of the keys any more than your locksmith is entitled to copies of your house keys.

> For normal people, Microsoft is not a threat actor here. Nor is the government.

"Normal people" includes journalists, lawyers, activists, abuse survivors, and anyone else Microsoft might be legally compelled to surveil. Your threat model is "thieves and stalkers". Mine includes the state. Both are valid, but only one of us is forcing our model on everyone by default.

> the world runs on trust. Trust is a feature.

Trust in the wrong entity is a vulnerability. You're arguing we should trust a corporation with a legal department larger than most countries' regulators, one that's repeatedly been breached and is subject to government data requests in every jurisdiction it operates.

Your doctors-breaking-GDPR example is particularly telling: you've observed that bad UX causes people to route around security, and concluded that security is the problem rather than the UX. The solution to "delegation is hard" isn't "give up and trust corporations". It's "build better delegation mechanisms". One is an engineering problem. The other is surrender dressed as pragmatism.