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by soiltype
149 days ago
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But that seems almost trivially solved. In software it's common to value independent verification - e.g. code review. Someone who is only focused on writing new code instead of careful testing, refactoring, or peer review is widely viewed as a shitty developer by their peers. Of course there's management to consider and that's where incentives are skewed, but we're talking about a different structure. Why wouldn't the following work? A single university or even department could make this change - reproduction is the important work, reproduction is what earns a PhD. Or require some split, 20-50% novel work maybe is also expected. Now the incentives are changed. Potentially, this university develops a reputation for reliable research. Others may follow suit. Presumably, there's a step in this process where money incentivizes the opposite of my suggestion, and I'm not familiar with the process to know which. Is it the university itself which will be starved of resources if it's not pumping out novel (yet unreproducible) research? |
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That is good practice
It is rare, not common. Managers and funders pay for features
Unreliable insecure software sells very well, so making reliable secure software is a "waste of money", generally