I think it is very difficult to secure internet voting, someone can stand behind you and twist your arm or otherwise coerce you to vote for their candidate. Much harder to do when there are observers and witnesses at the polling booth.
>Internet voting needs to be anonymous and non demonstrable
Why? Honestly Internet voting would improve overall turnout, which seems more important. And we probably could accomplish anonymity with some clever cryptography.
"I give you $50 if you vote for me, you'll get it when I win the ballot"
If someone is willing to sell their vote in the first place, they have zero incentive to vote for another candidate. They only have to trust the buyer to follow up on his promise (which is required in any other scenario also).
You have to trust the voting place/ballot receiver in all cases. Like, after they take your name, you need to make sure that they aren't secretly associating your name with the ballot you are filling in. Likewise, if you vote by mail, you need to make sure that they aren't associating your identity on the envelope with the anonymous ballot inside the envelope.
* “internet voting is insecure” wins because your internet money is not safe.
Hackers get into people's bank accounts all the time. It's actually amazing to me how many people here somehow think that internet banking is anything but massively insecure.
Second is also possible in jurisdictions that issue id cards with cryptographic layer AND ability with the companion app to only prove a scope of the identity.
Without saying too much about my home country I believe it's doable.
Internet money needs to be the opposite, and reversible through the courts.