| You seem to be relying too heavily on your own "language games". For instance, flip flopping between using "LLM technology" and "AI" to refer to what appears to be the same thing in your argument. I find it all quite incomprehensible. > If you'd like to hear my opinion, I happen to think that LLM technology is the most important, arguably the only thing, to have happened in philosophy since Wittgenstein; So, assume cognitive bias and a penchant for hyperbole. > LLM technology is the most important, arguably the only thing, to have happened in philosophy Why would "LLM technology" be important to philosophy? > arguably the only thing, to have happened in philosophy Did "LLM technology" "happen in philosophy"? What does it mean to "happen in philosophy"? > indeed, Wittgenstein presents the only viable framework for comprehending AI in all of humanities. What could this even mean? Linguistics would appear at least one other of the applicable humanities to large language models. Wittgenstein was famously critical of Turing's claim that a machine can think to the extent he claimed it caused Turing to create misunderstandings even in his mathematics. Wittgenstein also disliked Cantor. and even the concept of 'sets'. I am struggling to see how this all adds up to being the "only viable framework for comprehending AI". > If it so happens that AI can help illuminate these things, like all good tools in philosophy of language do, it also means that we're in luck, and there's hope for better institutions. This is a wild ride. So, "AI" exploits weaknesses in institutions, but this is different from "destroying institutions", and its a good thing because we can improve the institutions by fixing the exploitable areas; which is also a wholly speculative outcome with many counterexamples in real life. Reads like: "Sure, I broke your window and robbed your store, but you should be thanking me and encouraging me to break more windows and rob more people because I illuminated that glass is susceptible to breaking when a rock is thrown at it. Oh, your shit? I'm keeping it. You're welcome." |
> Why would "LLM technology" be important to philosophy?
Well, because it has empirically proved that Wittgenstein was more or less right all along, and linguists like Chomsky (I would go as far as saying Kripke, too, but that's a different story) were ultimately wrong! To put it simply: in order to learn language, and by extension, compute arbitrary discourses, you don't need to ever learn definitions of words. All you need is demonstrations of language use. The same goes for syntax, grammar, and a bunch of other things linguists were obsessing about for decades, like modality. (But that's a different story altogether!) Computer science people call this the bitter lesson, but that is only a statement on predictive power, not emergent power. If it only ever were the case for learning existing discourses, that wouldn't be remotely as surprising. Computing arbitrary discourses is a much stronger proposition!
> Did "LLM technology" "happen in philosophy"? What does it mean to "happen in philosophy"?
LLM's were a bit of a shock, and a lot of people are not receptive to this idea that Wittgensteinians won, basically, game over. There will be more flailing, but ultimately they will adapt. You can already see this with Askell and other traditionally-trained philosophy people adopting language games, it's only that they call it alignment. Neither a coincidence she went to Cambridge. It will take a bit of time for "academic philosophy" to recognise this, but eventually they will, because why wouldn't they?
Game over.
> Linguistics would appear at least one other of the applicable humanities to large language models.
Yeah, not really. All the interesting stuff that is happening has very little to do with linguistics. There's prefill from grammar, but it would be a stretch to attribute it to linguistics. In linguistic literature, word2vec was big time for the time being, but they did fuck-all with it ever since. I'm not trying to be hyperbolic here, either.
> Wittgenstein was famously critical of Turing's claim that a machine can think
I never understood this line of reasoning. So what Witt. and Turing had disagreements at the time? Witt. never had a chance to see LLM's, or anything remotely like it. This was unexpected result, you know? We could have guessed that it would be the case, but there were no evidence. We still don't have a solid theory to go from Frege to something like modern LLM's, and we may never will, but the evidence is there—Wittgenstein was right about you need for language to work.
> Wittgenstein also disliked Cantor. and even the concept of 'sets'.
I don't see what this has anything to do with?
> So, "AI" exploits weaknesses in institutions, but this is different from "destroying institutions", and its a good thing because we can improve the institutions by fixing the exploitable areas; which is also a wholly speculative outcome with many counterexamples in real life.
I never said AI "exploits" anything. I only ever said that being able to compute arbitrary discourses opens so many more doors than what's a pigeonhole insinuation like that would entail. What wasn't obvious before, is becoming obvious now. (This is why all these people are coming out with "revelations" on how AI is destroying institutions.) And it's not because of material circumstance. Just that some magic was dispelled, so stuff became obvious, and this is philosophy at work.
This is real philosophy at hand, not some academic wanking :-)