[tgsovlerkhgsel]

There are some distinctions between gambling and prediction markets. For example, in prediction markets, some forms of insider trading are considered somewhat desirable - essentially, it monetizes insiders leaking inside information.

Other forms of insider trading can be problematic: What if someone (could be an individual or even an uncoordinated group) bets millions of dollars on you not doing X, in the hopes of you taking the opposite bet and doing X?

The most extreme that I've seen presented so far are markets where people can predict the death date of a person. On the surface, that just seems like a morbid bet. Once you consider the above form of insider trading, you realize that this can act as a reward for someone who can accurately predict the death date of said person, for example because they're making the counter-trade from a phone next to a high-powered rifle on the rooftop across the street - and like in the bribe example above, the people on the "losing" side of the bet might not mind too much. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Assassination_market

[tshaddox]

I've never quite understood what's supposed to be so mind-blowing about the assassination market concept. I think the concept is supposed to be that assigning legal responsibility for such a killing would be difficult, since no one is literally paying an assassin.

But surely the answer is just that governments can and should ban prediction markets that are deemed to directly incentivize a crime. Where exactly to draw the line is challenging, sure, but no more challenging than all the other stuff that legal systems have to deal with. After all, pretty much any existing market (like stock markets) could be influenced by murdering certain people.

You may say "oh, but assassination markets are unique in that they're hard to ban those markets because they use cryptocurrencies and other decentralized/anonymous/censorship-resistant communication technologies." Well, okay, but if those technologies are so effective than people can already just run normal murder-for-pay markets.

[epolanski]

I am completely against any narrative attempt to distinguish gambling and prediction markets.

[TeMPOraL]

> What if someone (could be an individual or even an uncoordinated group) bets millions of dollars on you not doing X, in the hopes of you taking the opposite bet and doing X?

From their POV, that's the purest form of voting with money. If you do X, they're presumably happy with the outcome they just paid for; if you do the opposite of X, they at least have their payouts as consolation prize.

[ToValueFunfetti]

>What if someone (could be an individual or even an uncoordinated group) bets millions of dollars on you not doing X, in the hopes of you taking the opposite bet and doing X?

If the market is efficient and aware of the bribery effect, others will bet that you will do X up to the point where the indirect bribe is equal to the cost of you doing X. If you have private knowledge that a bribe would be taken, you probably have the access to do it far cheaper off market (and you can still use crypto).

[suddenlybananas]

>If the market is efficient

If my grandmother had wheels she'd be a bike

[Saline9515]

Lost opportunity to make a very nice python joke.