[Joel_Mckay]

A kvm hypervisor is not perfect, as sandbox escape was demonstrated even with https://qubes-os.org/ . On modern AMD/Intel/ARM64 consumer processors it is not possible to completely prevent bleeding keys across regions.

Only the old Sun systems with hardware encrypted mmu pages could actually enforce context isolation.

If performance is not important, and people are dealing with something particularly nasty... than running an emulator on another architecture is a better solution. For example, MacOS M4 with a read-only windows amd64 backing-image guest OS is a common configuration.

https://github.com/86Box/86Box/releases

https://github.com/Moonif/MacBox/releases

Best of luck =3

[flipped]

I am hearing first time of a sandbox escape in QubesOS. Can you link the source?

[Joel_Mckay]

It was a POC from shortly after Spectre CVE dropped, and I'm not sure if the source code made it into the public. I heard about the exploit in a talk by Joanna Rutkowska, where she admitted the OS could no longer completely span TCSEC standards on consumer Intel CPUs. YMMV

The modern slop-web is harder to find things now, and I can't recall specifically if it was something more than just common hypervisor guest escape. =3