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by csuwldcat
170 days ago
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There's also the specific case of synced passkeys, which aren't exposed to CTAP management APIs for external parties, only to the OS/platform itself. You seem tied to a narrative where a user can install a native app that gets permission to call core OS/platform APIs that let the app get all the public keys of passkeys on the device, but no such permissions/APIs exist for apps, and providing them would be in explicit violation of the fundamental security model. In reality, only the platform/OS and highly trusted actors/components that are already within the existing trust model have such access for internal purposes, and if that's not a safe assumption, it would have broader implications beyond this concern. |
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yes? one of the main points of passkeys is that if your device is compromised: all your accounts aren't.
with your system, they are
> In reality, only the platform/OS and highly trusted actors/components that are already within the existing trust model
no, they aren't, if they were, the HSM/secure enclave wouldn't be needed at all
I've entertained this nonsense for almost 2 hours now, I'm done
the fact is, if the public key gets out, then your system is compromised
and I have shown you most (df not all) roaming authenticators have a way to enumerate public keys
as does every software HSM I've ever interacted with