[akerl_]

No, we don’t agree. There are things that source code is good for, but validating the presence or absence of illicit data stealing code in apps delivered to consumers is not one of those things. For that, source code can show you obvious malfeasance, but since it’s not enough to rule out obvious malfeasance, you’re stuck going to analysis of the compiled app in both cases.

The population of users who have a verifiable path from an open source repo to an app on their device is a rounding error in the set of humans using messaging apps.

[anonym29]

I think we've both made our positions clear. From my perspective, you're continuing to heavily cite user statistics that are irrelevant to the properties of verifiability or trustworthiness of the applications themselves, the goalposts I am discussing keep being moved, and there is a repeated pattern of neglect to address the points I'm raising. Readers can judge for themselves. Curious readers should also read about the history of Meta's Onavo VPN software and resulting lawsuits and settlements in evaluating the credibility of Meta's privacy marketing.

[akerl_]

Just to be crystal clear about the goalposts: I said at the start of this chain that if somebody wants secure messaging, they should use Signal or WhatsApp.

You raised concerns about lack of source availability, and I’ve been consistent in my replies that source availability is not the way that somebody wants secure messaging is going to know they’re getting it. They’re going to get it because they’re using a popular platform with robust primitives, whose compiled/distributed apps receive constant scrutiny from security researchers.

Signal and WhatsApp are that. Concerns about Meta’s other work are just noise, in part because analysis of the WhatsApp distributed binaries doesn’t rely on promises from Meta.