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by manarth
182 days ago
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The FAA report[1] gives a more comprehensive description of events. The pitot tubes had differential icing, and didn't all read 0kts – they reported different velocity against each tube, such as 40kts or 60kts (against an expected baseline of ~ 275kts). The computer correctly recognised the data was invalid and rejected it. It's a common narrative that the captain immediately figured out the issue. The report and transcript of the cockpit recording[2] notes that the captain's interventions showed that he had not identified the stall, nor had the copilots. ~ cockpit recording ~
0:00 autopilot disconnects
0:01 [copilot right] "I have the controls"
0:11 [copilot right] "We haven't got a good display of speeds"
1:26 captain enters cockpit
1:30 [copilot right] "I don’t have control of the airplane at all"
1:38 [captain] "Er what are you doing?"
3:37 [captain] "No no don't climb"
4:00 [captain] "Watch out you’re pitching up there"
4:02 [copilot right] "Well we need to we are at four thousand feet"
4:23 ~ recording stops ~
[1] https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/AirFrance447_BEA.pdf
[2] https://bea.aero/uploads/tx_elyextendttnews/annexe.01.en.pdf
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Thank you. I had not seen the transcript before.
Is it possible that 40/60 kts indicates a stall? Nevertheless, the drop in altitude while the nose was up should also indicate a stall.
I know that designing avionics, and accounting for all possible scenarios is a difficult job, and we learn from the failures. But I don't buy that it was impossible/impractical for the avionics to figure out what was going on based what the other instruments were saying.