Not sure why that's contorting, a markov model is anything where you know the probability of going from state A to state B. The state can be anything. When it's text generation the state is previous text to text with an extra character, which is true for both LLMs and oldschool n-gram markov models.
A GPT model would be modelled as an n-gram Markov model where n is the size of the context window. This is slightly useful for getting some crude bounds on the behaviour of GPT models in general, but is not a very efficient way to store a GPT model.
I'm not saying it's an n-gram Markov model or that you should store them as a lookup table. Markov models are just a mathematical concept that don't say anything about storage, just that the state change probabilities are a pure function of the current state.
Yes, technically you can frame an LLM as a Markov chain by defining the "state" as the entire sequence of previous tokens. But this is a vacuous observation under that definition, literally any deterministic or stochastic process becomes a Markov chain if you make the state space flexible enough. A chess game is a "Markov chain" if the state includes the full board position and move history. The weather is a "Markov chain" if the state includes all relevant atmospheric variables.
The problem is that this definition strips away what makes Markov models useful and interesting as a modeling framework. A “Markov text model” is a low-order Markov model (e.g., n-grams) with a fixed, tractable state and transitions based only on the last k tokens. LLMs aren’t that: they model using un-fixed long-range context (up to the window). For Markov chains, k is non-negotiable. It's a constant, not a variable. Once you make it a variable, near any process can be described as markovian, and the word is useless.
Sure many things can be modelled as Markov chains, which is why they're useful. But it's a mathematical model so there's no bound on how big the state is allowed to be. The only requirement is that all you need is the current state to determine the probabilities of the next state, which is exactly how LLMs work. They don't remember anything beyond the last thing they generated. They just have big context windows.
The etymology of the "markov property" is that the current state does not depend on history.
And in classes, the very first trick you learn to skirt around history is to add Boolean variables to your "memory state". Your systems now model, "did it rain The previous N days?" The issue obviously being that this is exponential if you're not careful. Maybe you can get clever by just making your state a "sliding window history", then it's linear in the number of days you remember. Maybe mix the both. Maybe add even more information .Tradeoffs, tradeoffs.
I don't think LLMs embody the markov property at all, even if you can make everything eventually follow the markov property by just "considering every single possible state". Of which there are (size of token set)^(length) states at minimum because of the KV cache.
The KV cache doesn't affect it because it's just an optimization. LLMs are stateless and don't take any other input than a fixed block of text. They don't have memory, which is the requirement for a Markov chain.
Have you ever actually worked with a basic markov problem?
The markov property states that your state is a transition of probabilities entirely from the previous state.
These states, inhabit a state space. The way you encode "memory" if you need it, e.g. say you need to remember if it rained the last 3 days, is by expanding said state space. In that case, you'd go from 1 state to 3 states, 2^3 states if you needed the precise binary information for each day. Being "clever", maybe you assume only the # of days it rained, in the past 3 days mattered, you can get a 'linear' amount of memory.
Sure, a LLM is a "markov chain" of state space size (# tokens)^(context length), at minimum. That's not a helpful abstraction and defeats the original purpose of the markov observation. The entire point of the markov observation is that you can represent a seemingly huge predictive model with just a couple of variables in a discrete state space, and ideally you're the clever programmer/researcher and can significantly collapse said space by being, well, clever.
>Sure many things can be modelled as Markov chains
Again, no they can't, unless you break the definition. K is not a variable. It's as simple as that. The state cannot be flexible.
1. The markov text model uses k tokens, not k tokens sometimes, n tokens other times and whatever you want it to be the rest of the time.
2. A markov model is explcitly described as 'assuming that future states depend only on the current state, not on the events that occurred before it'. Defining your 'state' such that every event imaginable can be captured inside it is a 'clever' workaround, but is ultimately describing something that is decidedly not a markov model.
It's not n sometimes, k tokens some other times. LLMs have fixed context windows, you just sometimes have less text so it's not full. They're pure functions from a fixed size block of text to a probability distribution of the next character, same as the classic lookup table n gram Markov chain model.
1. A context limit is not a Markov order.
An n-gram model’s defining constraint is: there exists a small constant k such that the next-token distribution depends only on the last k tokens, full stop. You can't use a k-trained markov model on anything but k tokens, and each token has the same relationship with each other regardless. An LLM’s defining behavior is the opposite: within its window it can condition on any earlier token, and which tokens matter can change drastically with the prompt (attention is content-dependent). “Window size = 8k/128k” is not “order k” in the Markov sense; it’s just a hard truncation boundary.
2. “Fixed-size block” is a padding detail, not a modeling assumption.
Yes, implementations batch/pad to a maximum length. But the model is fundamentally conditioned on a variable-length prefix (up to the cap), and it treats position 37 differently from position 3,700 because the computation explicitly uses positional information. That means the conditional distribution is not a simple stationary “transition table” the way the n-gram picture suggests.
3. “Same as a lookup table” is exactly the part that breaks.
A classic n-gram Markov model is literally a table (or smoothed table) from discrete contexts to next-token probabilities. A transformer is a learned function that computes a representation of the entire prefix and uses that to produce a distribution. Two contexts that were never seen verbatim in training can still yield sensible outputs because the model generalizes via shared parameters; that is categorically unlike n-gram lookup behavior.
I don't know how many times I have to spell this out for you. Calling LLMs markov chains is less than useless. They don't resemble them in any way unless you understand neither.
QM and GR can be written as matrix algebra, atoms and electrons are QM, chemistry is atoms and electrons, biology is chemistry, brains are biology.
An LLM could be implemented with a Markov chain, but the naïve matrix is ((vocab size)^(context length))^2, which is far too big to fit in this universe.
Like, the Bekenstein bound means writing the transition matrix for an LLM with just 4k context (and 50k vocabulary) at just one bit resolution, the first row (out of a bit more than 10^18795 rows) ends up with a black hole >10^9800 times larger than the observable universe.
Yes, sure enough, but brains are not ideas, and there is no empirical or theoretical model for ideas in terms of brain states. The idea of unified science all stemming from a single ultimate cause is beautiful, but it is not how science works in practice, nor is it supported by scientific theories today. Case in point: QM models do not explain the behavior of larger things, and there is no model which gives a method to transform from quantum to massive states.
The case for brain states and ideas is similar to QM and massive objects. While certain metaphysical presuppositions might hold that everything must be physical and describable by models for physical things, science, which should eschew metaphysical assumptions, has not shown that to be the case.