[phantasmish]

The simulation isn't an operating brain. It's a description of one. What it "means" is imposed by us, what it actually is, is a shitload of graphite marks on paper or relays flipping around or rocks on sand or (pick your medium).

An arbitrarily-perfect simulation of a burning candle will never, ever melt wax.

An LLM is always a description. An LLM operating on a computer is identical to a description of it operating on paper (if much faster).

[gnull]

What makes the simulation we live in special compared to the simulation of a burning candle that you or I might be running?

That simulated candle is perfectly melting wax in its own simulation. Duh, it won't melt any in ours, because our arbitrary notions of "real" wax are disconnected between the two simulatons.

[hnfong]

They do have a valid subtle point though.

If we don't think the candle in a simulated universe is a "real candle", why do we consider the intelligence in a simulated universe possibly "real intelligence"?

Being a functionalist ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Functionalism_(philosophy_of_m... ) myself, I don't know the answer on the top of my head.

[hackinthebochs]

>If we don't think the candle in a simulated universe is a "real candle", why do we consider the intelligence in a simulated universe possibly "real intelligence"?

I can smell a "real" candle, a "real" candle can burn my hand. The term real here is just picking out a conceptual schema where its objects can feature as relata of the same laws, like a causal compatibility class defined by a shared causal scope. But this isn't unique to the question of real vs simulated. There are causal scopes all over the place. Subatomic particles are a scope. I, as a particular collection of atoms, am not causally compatible with individual electrons and neutrons. Different conceptual levels have their own causal scopes and their own laws (derivative of more fundamental laws) that determine how these aggregates behave. Real (as distinct from simulated) just identifies causal scopes that are derivative of our privileged scope.

Consciousness is not like the candle because everyone's consciousness is its own unique causal scope. There are psychological laws that determine how we process and respond to information. But each of our minds are causally isolated from one another. We can only know of each other's consciousness by judging behavior. There's nothing privileged about a biological substrate when it comes to determining "real" consciousness.

[hnfong]

Right, but doesn't your argument imply that the only "real" consciousness is mine?

I'm not against this conclusion ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie ) but it doesn't seem to be compatible with what most people believe in general.

[hackinthebochs]

That's a fair reading but not what I was going for. I'm trying to argue for the irrelevance of causal scope when it comes to determining realness for consciousness. We are right to privilege non-virtual existence when it comes to things whose essential nature is to interact with our physical selves. But since no other consciousness directly physically interacts with ours, it being "real" (as in physically grounded in a compatible causal scope) is not an essential part of its existence.

Determining what is real by judging causal scope is generally successful but it misleads in the case of consciousness.

[hnfong]

I don't think causal scope is what makes a virtual candle virtual.

If I make a button that lights the candle, and another button that puts it off, and I press those buttons, then the virtual candle is causally connected to our physical reality world.

But obviously the candle is still considered virtual.

Maybe a candle is not as illustrative, but let's say we're talking about a very realistic and immersive MMORPG. We directly do stuff in the game, and with the right VR hardware it might even feel real, but we call it a virtual reality anyway. Why? And if there's an AI NPC, we say that the NPC's body is virtual -- but when we talk about the AI's intelligence (which at this point is the only AI we know about -- simulated intelligence in computers) why do we not automatically think of this intelligence as virtual in the same way as a virtual candle or a virtual NPC's body?

[BobbyJo]

> If we don't think the candle in a simulated universe is a "real candle", why do we consider the intelligence in a simulated universe possibly "real intelligence"?

A candle in Canada can't melt wax in Mexico, and a real candle can't melt simulated wax. If you want to differentiate two things along one axis, you can't just point out differences that may or may not have any effect on that axis. You have to establish a causal link before the differences have any meaning. To my knowledge, intelligence/consciousness/experience doesn't have a causal link with anything.

We know our brains cause consciousness the way we knew in 1500 that being on a boat for too long causes scurvy. Maybe the boat and the ocean matter, or maybe they don't.

[phantasmish]

I think the core trouble is that it's rather difficult to simulate anything at all without requiring a human in the loop before it "works". The simulation isn't anything (well, it's something, but it's definitely not what it's simulating) until we impose that meaning on it. (We could, of course, levy a similar accusation at reality, but folks tend to avoid that because it gets uselessly solipsistic in a hurry)

A simulation of a tree growing (say) is a lot more like the idea of love than it is... a real tree growing. Making the simulation more accurate changes that not a bit.

[penteract]

I believe that the important part of a brain is the computation it's carrying out. I would call this computation thinking and say it's responsible for consciousness. I think we agree that this computation would be identical if it were simulated on a computer or paper. If you pushed me on what exactly it means for a computation to physically happen and create consciousness, I would have to move to statements I'd call dubious conjectures rather than beliefs - your points in other threads about relying on interpretation have made me think more carefully about this.

Thanks for stating your views clearly. I have some questions to try and understand them better:

Would you say you're sure that you aren't in a simulation while acknowledging that a simulated version of you would say the same?

What do you think happens to someone whose neurons get replaced by small computers one by one (if you're happy to assume for the sake of argument that such a thing is possible without changing the person's behavior)?

[cibyr]

It seems to me that the distinction becomes irrelevant as soon as you connect inputs and outputs to the real world. You wouldn't say that a 737 autopilot can never, ever fly a real jet and yet it behaves exactly the same whether it's up in the sky or hooked up to recorded/simulated signals on a test bench.

[amelius]

Here is a thought experiment:

Build a simulation of creatures that evolve from simple structures (think RNA, DNA).

Now, if in this simulation, after many many iterations, the creatures start talking about consciousness, what does that tell us?

[amelius]

> An arbitrarily-perfect simulation of a burning candle will never, ever melt wax.

It might if the simulation includes humans observing the candle.