| > Can you be more specific here? I don't see anything like that in my links. You made a general statement about attacks from GOS on GNU/Linux. I replied that this happens in the context of wrong comparisons being made. > You're trolling again, with no reasonable arguments. You can find a reply here: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=46176660 Im not trolling. You say you dont trust Google at all. Thats your position. Then my argument is to not trust their code, regardless of which project its submitted to. How is that unreasonable. Your argument is the unreasonable one. You somehow think contributions by other companies to Linux would balance out or erase your trust issues with the Google code? Why would that make any difference. > This is not the actual issue. The actual issue is that existing patches for a known vulnerability become unavailable, because Google decided so, making GOS potentially insecure. Patches without the source code shouldn't be trusted. The issue gets patched. Whether the code is published doesnt change the code... People can also sti reverse engineer the code. Its not a black box. Its often just Java code. You can easily decompile Java, bytecode maps easily to the source code. Its an effort you have to do, yes, but so is reading and properly auditing the source code as well. You seem to think publishing the code somehow magically makes it more secure. While that isnt true. People would still need to properly audit it. It barely happens in practice. And it can also perfectly be done with compiled code. > Until Google alters the deal If Google were to put the restriction in AOSP, GOS can simply remove it from the code... And if its not in AOSP than it doesnt impact GOS. > There is no security without freedom. If you're protected by a steel door, but you don't have the key, you aren't safe: You're imprisoned. You can't protect yourself from Google without having freedom to run what you want on "your" device. This metaphor doenst make any sense in relation to the planned sideloading restrictions. I suggest reading the blogposts from Google about what the process will look like. |
No, I provided two specific examples, one quoted and another linked to. None of them happend in the context of wrong comparisons being made.
> You say you dont trust Google at all. Thats your position. Then my argument is to not trust their code, regardless of which project its submitted to. How is that unreasonable.
Your argument is completely unreasonable. Google has full control over Android and therefore GrapheneOS. It has very little control over Linux. All their contributions to Linux are carefully verified by many independent parties and suspicious things not accepted by community are rejected. The latter doesn't happen in Android, see my examples above.
> The issue gets patched. Whether the code is published doesnt change the code...
Only if you 100% trust Google. I see you do and promote them. I wonder why you would defend a trillion-dollar, monoppolistic megacorp hostile to its users.
> People can also sti reverse engineer the code.
This takes huge effort and time. One can't rely on it to be secure.
> If Google were to put the restriction in AOSP, GOS can simply remove it from the code...
The effort to keep a hard Android fork up-to-date will grow exponentially. I don't expect that GOS team will manage to do it for long.
> This metaphor doenst make any sense in relation to the planned sideloading restrictions.
This is exactly what is happening with Android right now. Users are constantly loosing their control over the device in the name of the false sense of security.
> I suggest reading the blogposts from Google about what the process will look like.
This is not even funny. Are you working at Google? I suggest you to read blog posts by a non-profit instead: https://eff.org.