[alephnerd]

A lot of people seem to be forgetting that the Cambridge Analytica scandal started off with data that was supposed to be used for research projects at the University of Cambridge being exfiltrated for commercial political use [0].

That said, this is most likely a tit-for-tat by the EU against the Trump administration, because we live in a world where all countries (even the US) have now weaponized regulations for negotiating leverage.

Our red line in both the Biden admin as well as the current admin was the DSA. The EU's red line is not being included in any negotiation over the Russia-Ukraine Conflict. The US fights against the DSA by arguing about infringement on free speech. The EU then tries to fight back over market competition. And it goes on and on and on.

This is why a lot of businesses get antsy about trade wars.

[0] - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Facebook%E2%80%93Cambridge_Ana...

[TheAceOfHearts]

They could implement a similar system to what Facebook currently provides when doing research with platform data. I think they only allow access to carefully controlled data through a remote sandboxed environment.

I think Twitter is already providing access to this data through paid APIs too, so this is effectively subsidizing researcher access.

[alephnerd]

Probably, but as I mentioned before, the EU has been using the DSA as a negotiating tool against the US - just like we are using Free Speech absolutism and "censorship" as a tool against the EU in negotiations.

Unlike other major tech companies like Meta or Alphabet that fall under the DSA, X doesn't have a similar presence in the EU to give it a firewall. Alphabet has Poland on it's side [0], Meta has Ireland on it's side [1], Amazon has Luxembourg on it's side [2], and Microsoft has Czechia on it's side [7][8][9], and because of Musk's ties to the GOP, it becomes a useful political lever while not directly hurting individual EU states. If X somehow complies, some other issue will crop up against (eg.) Tesla despite the Gigafactory because Brandenburg is a lost cause if you aren't affilated with the AfD or BSW. It's the same reason why X doesn't push back when India passes a diktat because Indian law holds corporate leaders criminally liable and X has a significant India presence [10]

It's the same way how if you want to hold Germany by the balls you pressure Volkswagen [3] and if you want to pressure France [4] you target LVMH's cognac, scotch, and wine business [5].

This is a major reason why companies try to build GCCs abroad as well - being in the same room gives some leverage when negotiating regulations. Hence why Czechia, Finland, Luxembourg, and Greece pushed back against French attempts at cloud sovereignty [6] because OVHCloud only has a presence in France and Poland, but Amazon and Microsoft have large capital presences in the other 4.

[0] - https://www.gov.pl/web/primeminister/google-invests-billions...

[1] - https://www.euractiv.com/news/irish-privacy-regulator-picks-...

[2] - https://www.aboutamazon.eu/news/policy/amazon-leaders-meet-l...

[3] - https://www.ft.com/content/6ec91d4a-2f37-4a01-9132-6c7ae5b06...

[4] - https://videos.senat.fr/video.5409997_682ddabf64695.aides-au...

[5] - https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-07-03/eu-fight-...

[6] - https://www.euractiv.com/news/eu-digital-ministers-push-agai...

[7] - https://nukib.gov.cz/en/infoservis-en/news/2276-nukib-and-mi...

[8] - https://news.microsoft.com/europe/2017/03/31/satya-nadella-v...

[9] - https://mpo.gov.cz/en/guidepost/for-the-media/press-releases...

[10] - https://www.glassdoor.com/Location/X-Bengaluru-Location-EI_I...

[ampersandwhich]

alephnerd, I have to flat out disagree with your grievances [0][1][2][3][4][5]. The more I read, the worse it gets. The fact that some people in a foreign country feel personally persecuted by the DSA and are willing to bully us around is not a good argument against it [1]. In fact, I think the American attitude of having "red lines" about this is quite frankly irrelevant to the bigger picture [2]. I think there are plenty of ego-syntonic justifications for why it's okay to take a different stance than us on our policies, but while there are plenty of sources, I don't think there is a lot of reasoned analysis [3]. I'm sure much of it is shaped by personal circumstances. But I admit, sweeping historical references can be interesting too [4]. As a Swede, I can tell you that not a single person I know cares about random companies in Czechia, Luxembourg, Germany or France getting pressured [5]. I'm not very familiar with it, but I'm sure Finland already regrets their previous stance on cloud-infra. Perceptions have fundamentally changed about the United States as an ally. As for GCAP and FCAS, they have different requirements and serve different purposes. What's your take on the next Gripen?

If you want to pressure Volkswagen, go ahead. Nobody cares. The fundamental flaw in your position is your implicit assumption about what we value or what motivates us. We're not Americans. I don't think America's "non-tariff barriers" are a valid concern. They are disingenuous rhetoric for domestic consumption. Heads would roll if there was ever an agreement with the US to lower our standards and open up local industries to competition from lower quality foreign importers due to geopolitical pressure. Pressure is not going to undo the DSA or the GDPR because they have broad support. As others have said, it is decades overdue. If Elon Musk is mad about having to follow the law, I'm sure he can find sympathy elsewhere. His sour grapes are not principled, they are about protecting his ego and finding others who do so for him.

Sorry for the bluntness, but I feel it is very much warranted.

[0] - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=46170027#46170683

[1] - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=46170027#46170823

[2] - ibid.

[3] - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=46170027#46171255

[4] - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=46170027#46174642

[5] - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=46170027#46175036

[johnthewise]

Of course no one cares about random companies in Czechia or France getting pressured; it's not meant to sway public opinion in Sweden, otherwise it would have been a waste of influence (money). I think alephnerd operates on a higher level of abstraction in his commentary, and you mistake this as him making specific validity claims about the policies. I think your grievances stem from this gap in abstraction.

For example, he might personally support DSA/GDPR, but he says that the US generally views these as “non-tariff barriers” to US service companies[0] and doesn’t bother evaluating the policies themselves. essentially saying for the purposes of predicting how the US will react, it's sufficient to analyze how the US views them and the actual policy details lose relevance in that context. He also shared a detail[0] about how the US placed their lobbyists as commissioners on GDPR, which is an interesting operational detail that argues against the broad support argument you’re making. Another question is whether there would still be broad support for some policy after it has been enacted and its adverse effects have been felt.

[0] - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=46170027#46174642

[alephnerd]

> For example, he might personally support DSA/GDPR, but he says that the US generally views these as “non-tariff barriers” to US service companies[0] and doesn’t bother evaluating the policies themselves. essentially saying for the purposes of predicting how the US will react, it's sufficient to analyze how the US views them and the actual policy details lose relevance in that context. He also shared a detail[0] about how the US placed their lobbyists as commissioners on GDPR, which is an interesting operational detail that argues against the broad support argument you’re making. Another question is whether there would still be broad support for some policy after it has been enacted and its adverse effects have been felt.

This.

> I think alephnerd operates on a higher level of abstraction in his commentary, and you mistake this as him making specific validity claims about the policies. I think your grievances stem from this gap in abstraction.

This (but does make me sound kind of pretentious). I started my career in Tech Policy (and considered a career in academia for a hot second) before pivoting to being a technical IC and climbing the ladder. I am responding as I would when I was a TF.

--------

I am a supporter of multilateralism and do think the EU was a net benefit, but the EU's approach to unanimity should have been reformed during the 2004-07 expansion, and the Eurozone should have been decoupled from the political goals of the EU then unified. I'd probably say I lean closer to reformist academics like Draghi and Garicano.

[alephnerd]

> Sorry for the bluntness, but I feel it is very much warranted

No worries. I think you misunderstood my post.

I used to work in the tech policy space, and I'm just bluntly explaining how we in the policymaking space view these discussions - especially with regards to negotiating with the EU.

> As a Swede, I can tell you that not a single person I know cares about random companies in Czechia, Luxembourg, Germany or France getting pressured

Well duh. You aren't the target for such an influence op. Leadership in (eg.) Czechia, Luxembourg, Germany or France are.

Much of the EU runs on unanimity, so all you need to do is pressure a single country and you have a veto.

This is what China has been doing with Sweden to a certain extent via Geely-owned Volvo Car Group and Polestar [0] and what we in the US have been doing with Ericcson [1][2][3]. Even the EU tries to use similar levers against the US [6].

To be brutally honest, this is how the game is played.

Most nations have now adopted the "elite-centric approach" to transnational negotiations [4], which makes it difficult for the EU, because the line between national soverignity and the EU with regards to foreign and economic affairs is not well defined. If you are not a veto player [5] your opinion does not matter.

Once you understand Political Science basics, a lot of stuff starts making sense. And I went to a college where heads of states would visit on a biweekly basis, and a large subset of European (and other regions) leaders attended or recruit from.

> What's your take on the next Gripen?

DoA if it depends on a GE power plant - the Volvo engine is a licensed version of the GE F404, so the US has final say on any Saab Gripen exports.

[0] - https://www.theguardian.com/business/2025/dec/02/china-volvo...

[1] - https://broadbandbreakfast.com/ericsson-ceo-calls-for-increa...

[2] - https://www.fierce-network.com/wireless/ericsson-ceo-home-si...

[3] - https://www.wsj.com/articles/ericsson-emerges-as-5g-leader-a...

[4] - https://academic.oup.com/book/12848/chapter-abstract/1631276...

[5] - https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt7rvv7

[6] - https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/21/business/economy/europe-t...

[deaux]

The DSA is decades overdue. It's absurd that there hasn't been one. There's also a dozen non-EU countries that have one, and that number has been growing rapidly.

To call it a "negotiation tool" is like calling literally any import tax or tariff - of which hundreds of thousands existed and were entirely accepted as squarely in the Overton Window long before Trump took office - purely a "negotiation tool". Just because it's new doesn't make it one any more so than such import taxes which have been around for ages.

[alephnerd]

> There's also a dozen non-EU countries that have one, and that number has been growing rapidly

Not really. Most of them offer significant carve-outs for American BigTech companies, or their implementation has been stayed, or significant capex subsidizes are provided to help reduce their impact for American BigTechs considering FDI in those countries.

It has been a DNC supported policy [0] as well to put pressure on countries that are even considering a digital services act. Heck the Biden admin began the process of making a legal example out of Canada [1] as a warning shot to other countries considering such options.

> To call it a "negotiation tool" is like calling literally any import tax or tariff ... purely a "negotiation tool".

That is what import taxes and tariffs are when not clubbed with subsidizes and formal sector specific industrial policy, because the act of giving MFN status to certain nations is itself a negotiating tactic. Canada's backing down on a digital service tax is a good example of that [2]

The whole point of (eg.) giving the UK preferential market access to the US over the EU, and giving Japan and South Korea preferential market access to the US over China is because it is a lever we can use when negotiating. Heck, France and Germany have both constantly tried leveraging tariffs and import taxes as a negotiating tactic against the US under the Biden admin [3][4] (and of course earlier).

As I mentioned above, this has been a slow-rolling negotiation between the US and EU since 2019. We in the US have bipartisan support to oppose the DSA and DSA-equivalents abroad. It was prominent stance in the Biden administration [0], and even Harris would have put a similar degree of pressure on the EU.

We have no obligation to give Europeans a red carpet, and you guys are not in a position to push back anyhow. The Chinese [5] and Russians have given similar ultimatums to the EU as well. What are you going to do? Sign an FTA with India and then face the same problem in 10 years with them?

You guys have fallen into the same trap that the Mughal and Qing Empires fell into in the 18th-19th century. Anyhow, we've unofficially signalled we are leaving the responsibility of Europe's defenses to Europe by 2027 [6] - meaning member states have no choice but to end up buying American gear or completely vacillate to Russia on Ukraine.

[0] - https://www.finance.senate.gov/chairmans-news/-wyden-and-cra...

[1] - https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-...

[2] - https://www.canada.ca/en/department-finance/news/2025/06/can...

[3] - https://www.politico.eu/article/france-and-germany-find-grou...

[4] - https://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/expressions/real-reason...

[5] - https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3316875/ch...

[6] - https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/us-sets-2...

[sofixa]

You're still not explaining how the DSA is supposedly a negotiating tactic from the EU any more than you could say that about GDPR. It's a new legal framewo tackling a relatively new set of problems. If any of them get watered down because of deals with the US, then you could make that sort of claim.

> Anyhow, we've unofficially signalled we are leaving the responsibility of Europe's defenses to Europe by 2027 [6] - meaning member states have no choice but to end up buying American gear or completely vacillate to Russia on Ukraine.

Or just buying from the existing European providers? Most American gear has a (sometimes better, cf. all the stuff even the US buys from European companies) European based equivalent. The only major exception is the F-35, but at least one 6th gen European jet is in the works, and unless fighting with the US, an 5th gen stealth fighter isn't really that needed. European manufacturers need to increase output, and they have been working on it and have done so quite a lot already.

[alephnerd]

> Or just buying from the existing European providers? Most American gear has a (sometimes better, cf. all the stuff even the US buys from European companies) European based equivalent.

That might happen over the long term (I still have doubts given that whenever a joint EU project is formed between two countries with vendors, they inevitabely end up collapsing due to domestic political considerations such as the European MBT and FCAS - no leader wants to be the leader who shut down a factory with 1200 high paying unionized jobs for the greater good), but cannot happen in the 1 year timeframe given.

The reality is, if we the US make a deal with Russia over the Russian invasion of Ukraine in the next 12 months, the EU will have no choice but to accept it if you do not put boots on the ground and if you do not expropriate Russian government assets in the EU. But your leadership class has rejected [2] both [3].

> European manufacturers need to increase output, and they have been working on it and have done so quite a lot already.

Not enough for the 1 year time frame needed

> how the DSA is supposedly a negotiating tactic from the EU any more than you could say that about GDPR

We view the DSA as a non-tariff barrier to American services companies. This is both a Trump admin view [0] as well as a Biden-era admin view [1].

We held similarly negative views about the GDPR until Ireland, Czechia, Poland, and Luxembourg accommodated us by hiring our lobbyists as their commissioners.

And this is why every single pan-EU project fails - every major country like the US (previously listed) and China [4][5] cultivated economic and political ties with members that act as vetos in decisions that have a unanimity requirements.

This is why I gave the comparison to the Qing and Mughal Empire - the English, French, and other European nations broke both empires by leveraging one-sided economic deals with subnational units (eg. the Bengal Subah in the Mughal Empire and the unequal treaties in the Qing Empire), which slowly gnawed away at unity.

We in the US, China, Russia, India, and others are starting to do the same to you - not out of explicit strategy, but due to the return of multipolarity and most European state's failure to recover from the Eurozone crisis.

[0] - https://www.ft.com/content/3f67b6ca-7259-4612-8e51-12b497128...

[1] - https://www.finance.senate.gov/chairmans-news/-wyden-and-cra...

[2] - https://tvn24.pl/polska/szczyt-w-paryzu-donald-tusk-przed-wy...

[3] - https://www.ft.com/content/616c79ee-34de-425a-865e-e94ba10be...

[4] - http://en.cppcc.gov.cn/2025-11/13/c_1140641.htm

[5] - https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202405/10/content_WS663d3b83...