[donpdonp]

it seems like all this infrastructure could be replaced by a DNS TXT record with a public key that browsers could use to check the cert sent from the web server. A web server would load a self-signed cert (or whatever cert they wanted), and put the cert's public key into a DNS record for that hostname. Every visit to a website would need two lookups, one for address and one for key. It puts control back into the hands of the domain owners and eliminates the need for letsencrypt.

[akovaski]

I'm not sure what that would solve. You would still need some central entity to sign the DNS TXT record, to ensure that the HTTPS client does not use a tampered DNS TXT record.

[tzs]

If someone can tamper with your DNS TXT records now they can get a certificate for your domain.

[franga2000]

Not tamper with the record directly, but MitM it on the way to a target.

[ishouldbework]

That should be prevented by dnssec no?

[tptacek]

Depends on who your adversary is. If it's your ISP: no, DNSSEC doesn't prevent that (in every mainstream deployment scenario, your upstream DNS recursive server is the only thing really doing DNSSEC validation).

[crote]

That's what DNSSEC is for.

[franga2000]

Yes, but that's just PKI again, which is what the OP was trying to avoid.

[arp242]

That's already the case with dns-01 verification, no?

Besides, if someone has access to your TXT records then chances are they can also change A records, and you've lost already.

[ryangibb]

E.g. DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities? https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6698

There's a TLSA resource record for certificates instead of a TXT encoding.

As far as I know no major browser supports it, and adoption is hindered by DNSSEC adoption.

[pennomi]

Ah but then how would nations spy on people by compromising the root certificate?

[pgporada]

You're insinuating that the Let's Encrypt roots are compromised?

https://letsencrypt.org/repository/#isrg-legal-transparency-...

[pennomi]

No, but it’s a well-established fact that some CAs are run by governments, some of which are publicly trusted by browsers.

[tptacek]

The mainstream root stores all require Certificate Transparency now.