| tell that to salt typhoon who collected copious amounts of data on all of us. https still uses unencrypted client hello's (ECH) across the vast majority of the internet, showing which domain the client is visiting in plaintext for multi-site servers to do SNI. DNS is still plaintext on most consumer routers/models provided by ISPs, stingray technology exists in the wild and is widely used to mimic cell towers. E2EE is not popular in consumer applications, even Telegram isn't E2EE and the main ones that claim they are like X's new Chat they have the keys on; Matrix having E2EE still shows meta data in plain text, room names in plain text. While iMessages, RCS, Signal are mostly mainstream, most people are unaware of the need for E2EE. RCS is its own set of issues. Pegasus, Cellbright, I can go on and on with the spyware companies that can just send a text message and infect devices with 0click exploits. We can have E2EE but if they can just see the screen or hook in to the messaging app's memory doesn't mean much. Pick up your cell phone, is it connected to Wifi? Can it see other Wifis? Apps track those nearby SSIDs and report to major databases to have accurate geo-location data down to the spot we stand. Don't get me started on Ad-Tech. The EU wants to install backdoors on everybody's devices and get rid of encryption entirely. Zero Trust Technologies are a fun thing to read in to, especially the need for them. |
That is not a US government program.
You also brought up ECH, DoH, DoT, Android's fake cell tower detection, and Android's NEARBY_WIFI_DEVICES permission that also demonstrate a strong industry-wide push to limit mass surveillance, contributing to my argument that GGP's assertion that nothing has changed is incorrect.
> The EU wants to install backdoors on everybody's devices and get rid of encryption entirely.
No, it doesn't. Just because someone proposes something doesn't mean the EU wants it, especially when the EU completely removes that proposal from the table.