[sethg]

For private borrowers who can’t make their payments and probably never will, there is bankruptcy law, which lays out a orderly procedure where the borrower asks for relief, the lenders make their claims, and a judge decides who ends up with how much. It’s not a perfect system by any means, but anyone who loans money understands the risk that the borrower will declare bankruptcy, and the credit markets still function.

For sovereign countries, unfortunately, there is no such procedure. If a government borrows money on the international credit market, its taxpayers can be on the hook for perpetuity. I would like to see those taxpayers have at least as much protection as private-sector borrowers—especially when the taxpayers of a democratic government are on the hook for the debts of its authoritarian or corrupt predecessors.

[spindritf]

> For sovereign countries, unfortunately, there is no such procedure.

Poor sovereign countries... Instead of having their assets wiped out and possibly facing years of payments (even if reduced), they have to deal with unbearable consequences, like a lot of finger waving and maybe a boat detained on request of someone not willing to finance political careers half way around the world. Dreadful. It may even come to the point that creditors will find some of those countries not trustworthy in the future and won't lend their governments more money.

[kylebrown]

When the loan originates from another government (or IMF), it goes into the accounts of preferred companies for building the infrastructure (eg Halliburton), often explicitly specified in the terms. The sovereign countries are just the channel through which the public-private lenders (eg JP Morgan at the Fed window) pay themselves.

edit: see Confessions of an Economic Hitman by John Perkins for a first-person account.

[sethg]

All countries—especially small and/or underdeveloped countries—need foreign trade in order to develop their economies, and it’s really really hard to engage in foreign trade without credit. And “if you stiff your current borrowers it may be harder to borrow in the future” is a risk that civilians have right now; creating a sovereign bankruptcy code won’t change that.

I forgot to mention that such a code would actually help borrowers, in the following way: For countries in a debt crisis, the lenders holding 90% of the debt may realize that they aren’t going to get paid back in full, and therefore would agree to a settlement where at least they get something back. But the ones holding the remaining 10% can pound the table and say “no, we want payment in full, and we’re legally entitled to it”... which leads the 90% bloc to say “well, if they’re still entitled to payment in full, we’re not going to be suckers and settle for less”... which leads the indebted country to say “we can’t possibly pay you all in full, so screw you all, we’re defaulting”.