The issue could have been avoided if MCAS was made properly redundant (and not rely on single sensor, wtf) and pilots were trained on it. It was all about the money. The airframe is fine.
The 777 and 787 before it are true fly-by-wire designs like the Airbus in question here; the 737 MAX isn't and never was. It just had a computer that was supposed to add artificial inputs under a very specific condition, so it could continue to fly like the older models under the same type certificate and not require extra pilot training. It turns out that the condition could be triggered erroneously, and the logic to determine the artificial inputs was deeply flawed.
The 737NG already had computer controlled feedback to the control columns, the MAX added computer controlled spoiler deployment (like the 757 and 767) and elevator trim.
Crucially, while trying to convince everyone that it’s basically the same old 737 to save on pilot retraining costs, nevermind the significantly larger engines.
Airbus is much more transparent about its automation. Pilots even learn about the procedure to fly an A320 with a complete fly-by-wire outage using only mechanical emergency elevator controls and differential thrust.
> Airbus is much more transparent about its automation.
Airbus is OK, but could be better. There is a long history of Airbus crews facing unexpected corner cases in their flight control laws, and fortunately only a few of them have had fatal outcomes. While there are only a few "major" modes, there are a surprisingly large number of edge cases that can be encountered.