[Lerc]

The prima facie case for free will* is that it feels free. If you can predict the action before the feeling it removes that argument (unless you want to invoke time travel as an option)

*one of the predominant characterisations of free will, anyway. I'm a compatiblist, so I have no issue with caused feelings of decision making being in conflict with free will. I also have a variation of Tourette's, so I have a different perception of doing things wilfully when compared to most people. It's really hard to describe how sometimes you can't tell if something was tic or not.

[immibis]

I don't see why having some latency in the path of free will makes it no longer free. Before my arm moves up, there is a motor neuron that fires that is always correlated with my arm moving up; doesn't that just mean the free will occurs earlier in the process than the motor neuron firing?

[Lerc]

The signal preceding the feeling is not an argument against free will. It is an argument against the feeling of free will being evidence for free will.

[kelseyfrog]

There are a lot of things I feel that end up not being "real," like embarrassment, a failure. and anxiety. Why should free will not be like any of those?

[nicoty]

Like how capsaicin makes food feel hot even when it isn't?

[kelseyfrog]

Yes, my point is that our senses often portray a reality that doesn't exist. Why should we assume free will is any different?

We don't even have a coherent and agreed upon definition. Every attempt at operationalizating it, results in it not being detectable. It's time we admit that there is no scientific basis for free will. It's not a scientific belief.

[Lerc]

That's kind-of where compatibalism comes in. For most definitions of free will, it is fighting the feeling that we would like to have it because it feels like we have it, and the evidence that says that the feeling that we have it does not provide any proof.

Sapolsky takes the approach to come up with a definition that can't be met and declare that it can't be met. Compatatablisim is more about finding a definition that is consistent with the feeling because without the feeling there isn't really anything to anchor the idea to anything meaningful. It doesn't use the feeling of making decisions as proof of any power as such, it is treating the feeling more like a measurement of the concept. Doing what we feel like doing is free will. What we feel like doing can be caused by anything and it still wouldn't matter.

Considering the inverse situation makes it seem like any other definition of freedom would be intolerable. If you 'freely' chose to do X but consistently had the perception of wanting to do not-X, it seems like you would not have a happy life. Similarly considering the alternative to determanism for your decisions seems like literal chaos. If something has no cause, it is literally random. Any pattern you can discern would indicate that it has a cause.

Then of-course you get into the nature of what is a cause and consequently considering the nature of time itself. Something travelling backwards in time interacting with something that you see appears uncaused because there was literally no preceding event that indicated it was going to happen (because it wasn't preceding, it came from the other direction)

That's one of those weird things I wonder about when people ask why is there more matter than antimatter, or why does times arrow mainly point in one direction. It feels like riding the crest of a wave wondering why all the water is going the same direction.

[bananaflag]

Hm, but maybe you can predict the feeling before you can predict the action. Checkmate atheists :)

(for the record I am also a compatibilist)