Hacker News new | ask | show | jobs
by sfifs 203 days ago
I'm very surprised the US doesn't seem to be taking the risk of Ukraine becoming a Nuclear Weapons state seriously. By now, they surely would have had time to develop get to the brink of weaponization as a backup plan - they've after all always had a nuclear industry. If they do so and offer cover to their neighbors who realize NATO may not be sufficient, we are in for interesting times.
2 comments

Ukraine WAS a nuclear weapons state, until the US agreed to protect them from Russia with the US's nuclear weapons, if they gave up their own.
It wasn't. It had some weapons on their territory but could not use them. The red button was always in Moscow.
> It had some weapons on their territory but could not use them. The red button was always in Moscow

In the 90s. Twenty years buys lots of time for code cracking, reverse engineering and—if that fails—bullshitting.

With the benefit of hindsight, Ukraine should have kept its nukes. (Finland, the Baltics, Poland and Romania should probably develop them.)

Right stealing nukes you cannot immediately operate as a 0-year old nation, to me it doesn't seems like an incredibly bright idea in a world where the existing nuclear states doesn't want anyone else to get nukes too.

And in any case it's was not simply removing the safety devices on the weapons, you need to be able to target the ICBMs at Russia, which Ukraine could not do:

> In fact, the presence of strategic nuclear missiles on its territory posed several dilemmas to a Ukraine hypothetically bent on keeping them to deter Russia. The SS-24s do not have the ability to strike targets at relatively short distances (that is, below about 2000 km); the variable-range SS- 19s are able, but Ukraine cannot properly maintain them. [...] the SS-19s were built in Russia and use a highly toxic and volatile liquid fuel. To complicate matters further, targeting programs and blocking devices for the SS-24 are Russian made. The retargeting of ICBM is probably impossible without geodetic data from satellites which are not available to Kiev.

> Cruise missiles for strategic bombers stored in Ukraine have long been 'disabled in place'.[...] As with ICBMs, however, retargeting them would be impossible for Ukraine, which does not have access to data from geodetic satellites; the same goes for computer maintenance.

From SIPRI research report 10; The Soviet Nuclear Weapon Legacy

So Ukraine did not have usable weapons at hand. But it did, and does, certainly have the capacity to build entirely new weapons, if given time.

> stealing nukes you cannot immediately operate as a 0-year old nation

Agreed. But nobody was invading Ukraine in 1994.

The weapons were seen as a security liability. In reality, they were bargaining chips.

> to me it doesn't seems like an incredibly bright idea in a world where the existing nuclear states doesn't want anyone else to get nukes too

To be clear, Kyiv made the right decision given what they knew in 1994. Non-proliferation was in vogue. America and British security guarantees meant something.

If Kyiv knew what we know today, that the Budapest security guarantees were worthless from each of Washington, London and Moscow; that wars of conquest would be back; and that non-proliferation would be seen through the lens of regional versus global security, it would have been a bright idea to demand more before letting them go, or at least to drag out negotiations so Ukraine could study the weapons and maybe even extract some samples.

> SS-24s do not have the ability to strike targets at relatively short distances (that is, below about 2000 km)

Again, having the nukes would give Kyiv leverage. At a minimum they'd have HEU and a proven design to study.

And again, don't undervalue bullshitting in geopolitics. If Kyiv said they have a short-range nuclear missile, it would not be credible. But would it be incredible enough to green light an invasion?

The US and Russia would have done a joint invasion under UN flag if Ukraine tried to steal the nukes dude, it's downright embarrassing to pretend that's the sort of thing you can do unpunished.

And doing that for some design info is really not worth the risk: just recruit some soviet weapons designers, for sure there are Ukrainians in that project already.

I could be wrong, but I don't think that nuclear warheads have such a long shelf life.
> I don't think that nuclear warheads have such a long shelf life

We literally don't know. A large part of stockpile stewardship programmes at the Sandia national labs is aimed at answering this question.

Oh, please, please, exclude Romania. I live close to our nuclear power plant. I'm scared of our incompetence as it is, without trying to make any nukes.
>Ukraine should have kept its nukes

They would've quickly sold them to Iran like they did with nuclear capable missiles. [0]

https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005-05/ukraine-admits-missi...

> They would've quickly sold them to Iran like they did with nuclear capable missiles

Unclear. A nuclear Kyiv would have different security incentives than a non-nuclear one.

Unclear? They are busy stealing hundreds of millions dollars[0] while having security incentive in form of ongoing war.

[0] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/11/19/world/europe/ukraine-zele...

Are the nuclear capable missiles worth anything if you don't have nuclear warheads for them to deliver?
What actually happened to the nukes the Ukrainians had? Were they transferred to the US? Destroyed?
Those were Soviet nukes, physically located in Ukraine but not controlled by it, same as any French/US nukes stationed in Germany would not make it a nuclear state.

The ones in Ukraine got moved into Russia, in exchange for Ukraine receiving money and security guarantees.

> Those were Soviet nukes, physically located in Ukraine but not controlled by it, same as any French/US nukes stationed in Germany would not make it a nuclear state.

This is not an accurate comparison.

It's not that Russia had nukes in Ukraine and withdrew them. Many of the Soviet soldiers manning them were Ukrainians and stayed behind. Much of the infrastructure for maintaining the Soviet arsenal was also in Ukraine and had to be rebuilt in Russia. The situation was more akin to if the US broke up and Louisiana (which has a lot of nuclear warheads stationed in it) is dealing with whether they are now a nuclear power, or if they need to hand them over to South Carolina or something.

Ukraine had multiple Long-Range Aviation bases in it, Louisiana only has one (Barksdale near Shreveport)
> It's not that Russia had nukes in Ukraine and withdrew them.

Russia is the single legal successor of the USSR, so all Soviet nukes became Russian nukes, regardless where they were located. So after the USSR broke up, Russia did have nukes in Ukraine and withdrew them.

Legal succession is mostly irrelevant and more complicated than that. Russia had operational control because it had taken physical control of the ex-Soviet command and control systems which were in Russia, and hence had the launch codes, etc.
To be fair, Russia becoming the single successor of the USSR wasn't a foregone conclusion in the early 1990s. There wasn't relevant precedent of a country dissolving I think -- Yugoslavia was still battling it out, Austria-Hungary was too long ago.
> Those were Soviet nukes, physically located in Ukraine but not controlled by it, same as any French/US nukes stationed in Germany would not make it a nuclear state

It's not quite the same, since Ukraine was part of the USSR, and Ukrainian scientists, engineers, and tradesmen contributed to the effort. Germany, on the other hand, was never part of the American federation, and didn't contribute to American weapons development...since Wernher von Braun/Operation Paperclip.

Indeed. There was even a question of whether they could legally be considered Ukrainian or Russian weapons, regardless of where the command centre was. To solve that while the talks were ongoing they set up a ‘joint’ command centre in Moscow with ex-SSR countries theoretically sharing joint control over the weapons with Moscow.

Ukraine at one point wanted to formally claim ownership over the weapons, as after all breaking the permissive action locks wasn’t that difficult. The US talked them out of it, as a lead up to the Budapest Memorandum.

We all know how much the security guarantees of that agreement were worth.

> We all know how much the security guarantees of that agreement were worth.

They were worth 30 years of peace. It wasn't a treaty. Everyone knew it was a handshake agreement without consequences for breaking it. It prevented an immediate war in eastern Europe after the fall of the USSR. A war that could have been much worse involving nuclear weapons.

Unfortunately the war came 30 years later.

Thanks. Did that happen immediately after the USSR breakup, i.e., when Yeltsin was in charge, or more recently under Putin?
Still under Yeltsin, 1994 I think. If you've heard about the Budapest Memorandum, that's exactly what it was about.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Budapest_Memorandum

Signed 5 December 1994

1. Respect the signatory's independence and sovereignty in the existing borders (in accordance with the principles of the CSCE Final Act).[10]

2. Refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of the signatories to the memorandum, and undertake that none of their weapons will ever be used against these countries, except in cases of self-defense or otherwise in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. (...)

Not really, went through the last post and its an utter pile of shit to be very polite. Basically russian propaganda, seen 1000 times.

It ignores that people should have their right to self-determination, don't want to live under russian oppression. As somebody whose family lives were ruined by exactly same oppression of exactly same russia (err soviet union but we all know who set the absolute tone of that 'union' and once possible everybody else run the fuck away as quickly as possible) I can fully understand anybody who wants to have basic freedom and some prospect of future for their children - russia takes that away, they subjugate, oppress, erase whole ethnicities, whoever sticks out and their close ones is dealt with brutally.

Not worth the electrical energy used to display that text. Unless you enjoy russian propaganda, then all is good.

I think this guy paints a difference in thought that is not really there. Putin sees Ukraine neutrality and impotence as vital to Russia's security. No, he probably does not want to actually annex Ukraine, that would be a ball ache he doesn't need, but he would like it to behave like Belarus.

I think the real difference lies in whether one believes Ukraine deserves to decide its own path, or if it's forever doomed to be a chess piece on the board between spheres of influence, which seems to be the mindset both Putin and Trump are stuck in.

The Senate never ratified that treaty, so no the US never agreed to so that. And the Budapest Memorandum doesn't say that anyway.
afaik Ukraine never got paid for nuclear disarmament as initially agreed - about $200 billions
I wonder where people get these ideas. The Budapest Memorandum is very short, it'll take five minutes to read if you want to know what was actually agreed. It seems like people just sort of imagine what they would have agreed to, and run with it.
thank you, will take a closer look. overheard it from whatever talk. ain't easy to fact check everything
It's pretty easy to avoid repeating unverified things, though.
They got paid mainly in nuclear fuel, there was some disagreement at the rate by which they got fuel in exchange for the weapons and maybe they didn't get quite all the fuel they should have, but for sure they did get paid at least partially.
The US did not agree to protect them. The signatures to the Budapest Memorandum agreed to respect Ukraine's sovereignty. Of the signatories, Russia is the only one that has violated the agreement.
Are you sure about that? Wikipedia says the following: "

3. Refrain from economic coercion designed to subordinate to their own interest the exercise by Ukraine, the Republic of Belarus, and Kazakhstan of the rights inherent in its sovereignty and thus to secure advantages of any kind.

4. Seek immediate Security Council action to provide assistance to the signatory if they "should become a victim of an act of aggression or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used".

Both seems to not happen as stipulated.

Edit: I didn't read properly, 4 obviously didn't happen, my bad.

The actual memorandum is shorter than the Wikipedia article about it. The English-language portion is literally only three pages of double spaced text.

https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%203007/P...

But the quotes you seem to challenge are also part of the original document you just linked.
I didn't challenge anything. Just posting a link to the actual source documentation.
I guess you could argue the US is kinda violating 3, since I think the Trump administration tried to ask for future financial reparations in exchange for support during the war. But 4? This isn't a nuclear conflict yet right?
Gladly not this condition: "in which nuclear weapons are used"
I don't think 3 has happened. 4 definitely has not happened. Did you miss the last 4 words you quoted?
the US trying to coerce Ukraine into surrendering territory, and then having to pay the US to do it is a violation of their sovereignty
What's the threat? "Do this or we'll stop helping you" is not a violation of sovereignty, distasteful though it may be in this case.
Article 3 of the Budapest memorandum[1]:

> 3. The United States of America, the Russian Federation, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, reaffirm their commitment to Ukraine, in accordance with the principles of the CSCE Final Act, to refrain from economic coercion designed to subordinate to their own interest the exercise by the Republic of Belarus of the rights inherent in its sovereignty and thus to secure advantages of any kind.

the US regime is attempting to do this

[1]: https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Memorandum_on_Security_Assura...

Minerals deal that US pushed for was already against this.
I don't see how this qualifies. Being given weapons isn't part of sovereignty, and putting conditions on the continued flow of weapons isn't a violation of it.

Economic coercion attempting to violate sovereignty would be something like the threatened (actual?) tariffs on Brazil for imprisoning Bolsonaro.

That’s a hell of reply, and shame on the US.

I don’t know this. Thank you.

The ideal scenario would have been if Ukraine had secretly retained 30-100 warheads. Everyone likes to prattle on about how they couldn't even have used them: those people are mentally retarded. A sophisticated government with nuclear and aerospace scientists could have easily dismantled interlocks and installed their own. Maybe not in a hurry, but they had 3 decades more or less. And if they didn't have the expertise, they might have outsourced it to Taiwan for the fee of a few nukes to keep.

Ukraine *desperately* needs to be a nuclear weapons state. Nothing else will suffice. They need more than one bomb, really more than three or four. Putin has to be terrified that no matter how many nuclear strikes he endures, another waits to follow. When he fears that, the war will end.

The war might end in Ukraine being flattened by Russian nuclear weapons if that happened. Putin would be backed into a corner. End the invasion after suffering a nuclear strike (or just the threat of one) and he'll risk being deposed and meet a gruesome end. Retaliate overwhelmingly and risk escalation from other nuclear powers. It's not clear to me that the second risk would be worse, and definitely not clear to me that Putin wouldn't see that as the better of two bad options.

As has been illustrated so well over the past few years, the power of nuclear weapons is a paradox. It allows you to make the ultimate threat. But that threat isn't credible unless people believe you'll use them. Because the consequences of using them are so severe, they're only credible if used in response to a correspondingly severe threat. Russia's arsenal hasn't allowed it to stop a constant flow of weapons to its enemy, an enemy which has invaded and still controls a small bit of Russian territory, and which frequently carries out aerial attacks on Russian territory. Ukraine faces much more of an existential threat (Ukraine has no prospect of conquering Russia, but the reverse is a serious possibility) so a nuclear threat from Ukraine would be more credible, but it could easily still not be enough. Certainly they're not an automatic "leave me alone" card.

I agree with most of what you said but there’s zero possibility Russia will take over all of Ukraine. Even Putin never claimed they would, this seems like a fantasy some people like to propagate to instigate fear in Europe or something. They spent three years on a gruesome fight to take less than a fifth of the territory and the rest is much harder as the further West you go, the more nationalist Ukrainians are. Check the maps of political opinion on Russia before the war started. Looks pretty close to the current frontline where the divide between pro and against Russia lies. Attacking a NATO country would mean the end for Russia and both sides know it perfectly well even if they may say otherwise publicly to either scare people into supporting their militarism or to gain political points.
I don't think it's likely, but I do think it's possible. If the US and EU get tired of helping Ukraine, they'll have a much harder time resisting Russian attacks. Once they do, why would Russia stop? Maybe they would. Maybe they'd pause, declare peace, and take the rest a year or three later. Maybe they'd just keep going. Putin saying he doesn't want it doesn't convince me in the slightest. He's a Soviet Union revanchist in terms of territory if not political system, and they owned the place before.

Not sure what the consequences of attacking NATO has to do with this.

Russia would still stop because controlling the rest of Ukraine would be more trouble than it is worth for them. And they might gain some concessions from the West. Attacking NATO is a common talk point in the West about what happens after Russia takes over Ukraine and Zelenskyy is more than happy to suggest that is to be expected as he says they are fighting for all of Europe.
Invading Ukraine in the first place appears to have been far more trouble than it was worth, and it didn’t stop them.
>Putin would be backed into a corner.

He'd be backed into the door marked "exit". There is no corner to trap him here.

>End the invasion after suffering a nuclear strike

And why do you believe that Zelensky or whoever is in charge would nuke Moscow first? Do you think that, if they had say 30 nukes (plenty for a few relatively harmless demonstrations) that this would be the first target? Obviously they'd pick something that he could decide to de-escalate afterwards.

>they're only credible if used in response to a correspondingly severe threat.

You mean such as the severe threat that Ukraine has endured for a decade at this point? The war now threatens to make them functionally extinct. Many have fled and will never return, their population is reduced to something absurdly low, many of their children have been forcibly abducted to be indoctrinated or tormented/tortured.

That condition you impose was pre-satisfied.

>Certainly they're not an automatic "leave me alone" card.

Of course not. They'd have to be used intelligently (readers: "used" does not imply detonated). It's not entirely clear to me that this would be the case with Ukraine/Zelensky. But nothing less at this point will suffice. Even if the US promised to put 150,000 troops on the ground, this wouldn't end. It would only escalate. Perhaps to that nuclear war you seem to fear.

I don't think Putin would have an exit. Losing the war would result in a major risk to his continued rule, and thus to his person, from a collapse of domestic support. A Ukrainian nuclear strike would present him with a choice: risk internal revolt, or risk the consequences of nuclear retaliation. I'm not remotely confident he'd choose the first. And, to be very clear, the second would make Ukraine (and likely the rest of the world) a lot worse off than they are today.
I dunno if I agree with them being nuclear. It just ups the possibility of a thermonuclear war instead of a conventional war. Just as I’d prefer that IN or PK or both not having those weapons.
The only historical examples we have of nuclear war occurred when the capability was unilateral. MAD actually works. The fear you have of a thermonuclear war is a good thing, and that fear can exist in Putin as well... but only if Ukraine has the weapons to instill such fear.

> Just as I’d prefer that IN or PK or both not having those weapons.

The only reason we haven't seen a Ukraine-like invasion in that region is that they both have nukes. MAD works.

Mini nukes change the equation. If you get two crazy hot-heads making decisions where no-one can overrule their decisions; things could go in unexpected ways. MAD presumes rational actors. If Iraq and Iran would have had nukes in the mid 80s I’m not sure that they wouldn’t have used them.