[eastdakota]

Because we initially thought it was an attack. And then when we figured it out we didn’t have a way to insert a good file into the queue. And then we needed to reboot processes on (a lot) of machines worldwide to get them to flush their bad files.

[gucci-on-fleek]

Thanks for the explanation! This definitely reminds me of CrowdStrike outages last year:

- A product depends on frequent configuration updates to defend against attackers.

- A bad data file is pushed into production.

- The system is unable to easily/automatically recover from bad data files.

(The CrowdStrike outages were quite a bit worse though, since it took down the entire computer and remediation required manual intervention on thousands of desktops, whereas parts of Cloudflare were still usable throughout the outage and the issue was 100% resolved in a few hours)

[cocoa19]

It might remind you of Crowdstrike because of the scale.

Outages are in a large majority of cases caused by change, either deployments of new versions or configuration changes.

[harivyom]

zone your deployments first -blue/green. Have a small blue zone, and test it out. If it works, then expand to green deployments.

A configuration file should not grow! design failure here, I want to understand

[tptacek]

Richard Cook #18 (and #10) strikes again!

https://how.complexsystems.fail/#18

It'd be fun to read more about how you all procedurally respond to this (but maybe this is just a fixation of mine lately). Like are you tabletopping this scenario, are teams building out runbooks for how to quickly resolve this, what's the balancing test for "this needs a functional change to how our distributed systems work" vs. "instead of layering additional complexity on, we should just have a process for quickly and maybe even speculatively restoring this part of the system to a known good state in an outage".

[asenchi]

This document by Dr. Cook remains _the standard_ for systems failure. Thank you for bringing it into the discussion.

[philipwhiuk]

Why was Warp in London disabled temporarily. No mention of that change was discussed in the RCA despite it being called out in an update.

For London customers this made the impact more severe temporarily.

[eastdakota]

We incorrectly thought at the time it was attack traffic coming in via WARP into LHR. In reality it was just that the failures started showing up there first because of how the bad file propagated and where it was working hours in the world.

[aaronmdjones]

Probably because it was the London team that was actively investigating the incident and initially came to the conclusion that it may be a DDoS while being unable to authenticate to their own systems.

[noir_lord]

Given the time of the outage that makes sense, they’d mostly be within their work day time (if such a thing apples to us anymore).

[dbetteridge]

Question from a casual bystander, why not have a virtual/staging mini node that receives these feature file changes first and catches errors to veto full production push?

Or you do have something like this but the specific db permission change in this context only failed in production

[forsalebypwner]

I think the reasoning behind this is because of the nature of the file being pushed - from the post mortem:

"This feature file is refreshed every few minutes and published to our entire network and allows us to react to variations in traffic flows across the Internet. It allows us to react to new types of bots and new bot attacks. So it’s critical that it is rolled out frequently and rapidly as bad actors change their tactics quickly."

[gizmo686]

In this case, the file fails quickly. A pretest that consists of just attempting to load the file would have caught it. Minutes is more than enough time to perform such a check.

[prawn]

Just asking out of curiosity, but roughly how many staff would've been involved in some way in sorting out the issue? Either outside regular hours or redirected from their planned work?

[mindentropy]

Is there some way to check the sanity of the configuration change, monitor it and then revert back to an earlier working configuration if things don't work out?

[tetec1]

Yeah, I can imagine that this insertion was some high-pressure job.

[globalise83]

The computer science equivalent of choosing between the red, green and blue wires when disarming a nuke with 15 seconds left on the clock

[dylan604]

Is it though? Or is it, oh, this is such a simple change that we really don't need to test it attitude? I'm not saying this applies to TFA, but some people are so confident that no pressure is felt.

However, you forgot that the lighting conditions are where only red lights from the klaxons are showing so you really can't differentiate the colors of the wires

[hbbio]

Thx for the explanation!

Side thought as we're working on 100% onchain systems (for digital assets security, different goals):

Public chains (e.g. EVMs) can be a tamper‑evident gate that only promotes a new config artifact if (a) a delay or multi‑sig review has elapsed, and (b) a succinct proof shows the artifact satisfies safety invariants like ≤200 features, deduped, schema X, etc.

That could have blocked propagation of the oversized file long before it reached the edge :)