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by MerrimanInd
233 days ago
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I've heard two arguments for these rewrites that don't always come up in these discussions. There are fair counterpoints to both of these but I think they add valuable dimensions to the conversation, or perhaps may explain why a rewrite may not seem justified without them. * It's becoming increasingly difficult to find new contributors who want to work with very old code bases in languages like C or C++. Some open source projects have said they rewrote to Rust just to attract new devs. * Reliability can be proven through years in use but security is less of a direct correlation. Reliability is a statistical distribution centered around the 'happy path' of expected use and the more times your software is used the more robust it will become or just be proven to be. But security issues are almost by definition the edgiest edge cases and aren't pruned by normal use but by direct attacks and pen testing. It's much harder to say that old software has been attacked in every possible way than that it's been used in every possible way. The consequences of CVEs may also be much higher than edge case reliability bugs, making the justification for proactive security hardening much stronger. |
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On your second part. I wonder how aviation and space and car industry do it. They rely heavily on tested / proven concepts. What do they do when introducing a new type of material to replace another one. Or when a complete assembly workflow gets updated.