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by DennisP
234 days ago
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This is just about seeing whether the model can accurately report on its internal reasoning process. If so, that could help make models more reliable. They say it doesn't have that much to do with the kind of consciousness you're talking about: > One distinction that is commonly made in the philosophical literature is the idea of “phenomenal consciousness,” referring to raw subjective experience, and “access consciousness,” the set of information that is available to the brain for use in reasoning, verbal report, and deliberate decision-making. Phenomenal consciousness is the form of consciousness most commonly considered relevant to moral status, and its relationship to access consciousness is a disputed philosophical question. Our experiments do not directly speak to the question of phenomenal consciousness. They could be interpreted to suggest a rudimentary form of access consciousness in language models. However, even this is unclear. |
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Not much but it likely has something to do with it, so experiments on access consciousness can still be useful to that question. You seem to be making an implication about their motivations which is clearly wrong, when they've been saying for years that they do care about (phenomenal) consciousness, as bobbylarrybobb said.