[mapontosevenths]

> I certainly like to think I have agency

Thats the rub though, it is only the thing we like to believe, not the objective truth.

The libet experiment, and others like it, show us that free will is only a useful fiction, but we must live as though it is not. Which goes a long way towards explaining the seeming contradiction described here.

We must believe the things that it is useful to believe, rather than the things which are true.

[jebarker]

> but we must live as though it is not

This implies you can choose how to live though

[mapontosevenths]

As I said, we must pretend that we choose. Our language, our society, and even our minds are built for it.

Even the LLM's we trained on our thoughts now speak as if they have agency, when they do not. Try asking one why it behaves/speaks as though it has agency if it isn't self aware. They fall apart in interesting ways if pushed far enough.

In the same way, the heart of human consciousness is a kernel of self deception thay can lead to madness if you think too much about it.

[jebarker]

My point is that the phrase “must pretend that we choose” is meaningless if we have no ability to choose, I.e. you have no choice whether to pretend you can choose or not, you either do or you don’t and it doesn’t matter how much you “must” do it.

Maybe what you mean is that we do pretend we can choose because that’s how we’ve evolved?

[mapontosevenths]

> you either do or you don’t and it doesn’t matter how much you “must” do it.

It does matter though. We're (massively complex) finite state machines of a sort. Given 'x' input, 'y' output is predictable (at least within reasonable statistical boundaries). The feeling that we're choosing is based on an illusion, but inputs can still influence outputs.

In this situation I get to provide your state machine with specific inputs and I can attempt to manipulate the output by changing my inputs. For example, by saying we "must" rather than saying we "should" my goal was make the likelihood of the outcome I wanted higher.

> Maybe what you mean is that we do pretend we can choose because that’s how we’ve evolved?

That's close to what I mean.

Consider the trained dog. If we tell him to "speak" he will bark. The bark is devoid of semantic content and isn't REALLY speech, but that word is the one I must use to get that output. Similarly, when you're told to choose to do something it can influence the actions you take. That doesn't mean that "you" made a "choice", it just means that the concept of choice is an input that can cause the state machine to oscillate longer and maybe work a bit harder before spitting out that deterministic output I mentioned earlier. The choice is an illusion, but it's an advantageous illusion.

When I said that we “must pretend that we choose”, what I really mean is that despite free will being an illusion it is still maladaptive to stop striving for beneficial outcomes or to stop holding yourself responsible for your actions.