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by danielbarla
243 days ago
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> First point: if you imagine that the brain is doing something like collapsing the quantum wavefunction, wouldn't you say that this is a functionally relevant difference in addition to an ontologically relevant difference? I can imagine a lot of things, but the argument did not go this far, it left it as "obvious" well before this stage. Also, when I see trivial simulations of our biological machinery yielding results which are _very similar_, e.g. character or shape recognition, I am left wondering if the people talking about quantum wavefunctions are not the ones that are making extraordinary claims, which would require extraordinary evidence. I can certainly find it plausible that these _could_ be one particular way that we could be superior to the electronics / valves of the argument, but I'm not yet convinced it is a differentiator that actually exists. |
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There has to be a special motivation to instead cast understanding as “competent use of a given word or concept,” (judged by whom btw?). The practical upshot here is that without this grounding, we keep seeing AI, even advanced AI make trivial mistakes and requires the human to give an account of value (good/bad, pleasant/unpleasant) because these programs obviously don’t have conscious feelings of goodness and badness. Nobody had to teach me that delicious things include Oreos and not cardboard.