[modeless]

Emperically, we have plenty of participation by the public in prediction markets without a prohibition on insider trading. We don't need to encourage any more.

> Allowing insider trading seems like a nearsighted way to increase volume for prediction markets, at the cost of long term value.

It's exactly the opposite. Banning insider trading in prediction markets would be a nearsighted way to increase volume (by encouraging more public participation) at the cost of long term value (accuracy, because insiders have the accurate information). Prediction markets can only be an "information value source" to the extent that they are accurate.

[jychang]

> Emperically, we have plenty of participation by the public in prediction markets without a prohibition on insider trading.

That's not true. As mentioned in this thread, the UK has laws in general against this (for betting). The USA also already has laws against specifically insider financial disclosures (Regulation FD) for corporations, that also applies to betting on prediction markets (Dirks vs SEC ruling in the general case). I'm not sure if Regulation FD applies to Nobel prizes, though, as that's not regulated by the SEC, and I'm not sure if the USA has general laws on illegal betting. But therefore, I do not think you can claim that "there is no prohibition on insider trading", as that's already clearly mostly illegal and thus already priced in for the public participation in prediction markets.

> It's exactly the opposite. Banning insider trading in prediction markets would be a nearsighted way to increase volume (by encouraging more public participation) at the cost of long term value (accuracy, because insiders have the accurate information).

Again, the current laws already ban insider trading from corporate sources, so the status quo is already what I propose; you don't see insiders trade on predictions like "would OpenAI release GPT-5 in 2025" as that's against the law.

> Prediction markets can only be an "information value source" to the extent that they are accurate.

This is also not true. Bayes Theorem! The information does not need to be fully accurate, just more accurate, enough to update from P(A) to P(A|B) given P(B), where P(B) is the prediction market's price on a certain prediction! That means an inaccurate prediction market can still inform your knowledge updates, if you can derive information from it.

[modeless]

> an inaccurate prediction market can still inform your knowledge updates

I didn't say an inaccurate prediction market is completely worthless. But it is self-evident that an accurate prediction market is a lot more valuable than an inaccurate one.

> the current laws already ban insider trading from corporate sources

Not only are most markets not related to corporations including the most important ones, I don't believe that insiders are actually that discouraged from trading even on corporate markets, and more importantly I don't believe the public believes insiders are prevented from trading. Everyone on Polymarket knows it's the wild west, and yet people still trade plenty.

[jychang]

> I don't believe that insiders are actually that discouraged from trading even on corporate markets, and more importantly I don't believe the public believes insiders are prevented from trading.

Yeah, you're just describing humans behaving irrationally then. That's clearly not rational behavior (which to be fair, is totally expected for humans), which means that even if it's descriptive of the current markets now, that's not actually ideal.