[yabones]

I'm pretty "curious" when it comes to public networks. I'll scan coffee shops, stadiums, hotels, bus hotspots, anything I can connect to. Some networks are set up well, others not so much.

I would never in a thousand years run a sweep on an airplane network. That's massively risky, to the point you might never be allowed on a jet again. Anything to do with aviation I am on my absolute best behaviour.

[ActorNightly]

The router is 100% separated from the rest of the plane, and has a fuse on the power. You can't really mess anything up and the only chance of you getting caught is if you somehow manage to ddos the network.

The fun thing to do on the plane is clone the wifi and add an option to log in with google or meta or apple credentials....

[zavec]

Without commenting on the appropriateness of what they did, the author doesn't say they did anything like a sweep. It looks like they were manually poking a few things with dig and ping, not firing up nmap.

[reactordev]

Circumventing security on a network, on a plane, is definitely up there regardless if you sweeped or not. IANAL but that could put you in DHS crosshairs.

[ogurechny]

The exaltation displayed in this discussion thread is something everyone should ponder about. Some stupidity specific to certain era and place on Earth, just another tumour of uncontrolled bureaucracy which always grows, is discussed as some eternal property of God-given Universe.

Hijacked plane is a popular media spectacle with lots of ties to other images and scenes. Millions are ready to discuss it, or listen to the thrilling stories. “This is important for security!” is a shazam in that context. At the same time, much closer and routine dangers directly affecting many people (power plants, refineries, railroads and so on) are kept in check by underpaid workers who can't even make companies fix sensors or replace something until it is rusted through. Effectively, “this is not important for anything”, nor public is interested in TV shows about working pipeline that is not getting blown up. Those who want money and power naturally stick to impressions that work for the crowd they are given.

Propaganda is most successful when people do the required thing on their own, agree that it's absolutely impossible to evade, and even encourage each other. Something in this day and age makes people themselves adore certain forms of propaganda, and even demand to be told specific lies. Among other things, images of stupid social machines crushing someone (“they'll put you on the list”, etc.) seem to weirdly stimulate the crowd.

Even in so-called globalised world there are examples that crack the habituation. In country A, any big gathering of people needs to be formally approved, supplied with hordes of policemen (thankfully, not tanks), fences (thankfully, not barbed wire), entrance searches (thankfully, without stripping). When you ask anyone about that, they promptly respond with “What if terrorists/enemies decide to attack the crowd?” or “What if they start to riot?” (notice that “they”), etc. Even most obvious security theatre acts are automatically accepted with promotion to “psychological stuff that helps to detect those people in the crowd”. In country B, no less “civilised”, the same event is handled by some private company that is mostly worried about portable toilets or electric generators, and people come freely to the venue if they like it (just buy the ticket).

The odds of something wrong happening are roughly the same, but people reason about themselves and those around them very differently. That mental picture of the world shapes the thing that happens, not the alleged expert opinions or calculations.

[woodrowbarlow]

i appreciated this comment, even though it downplays real pragmatic concerns. from a security perspective, should getting on an airplane (especially for domestic flights) really be all that different from getting on a bus? are the potential outcomes different enough to justify the differences in security measures?