[lxgr]

> And "lying" to it is not morally equivalent to lying to a human.

I never claimed as much.

This is probably a problem of definitions: To you, "lying" seems to require the entity being lied to being a moral subject.

I'd argue that it's enough for it to have some theory of mind (i.e. be capable of modeling "who knows/believes what" with at least some fidelity), and for the liar to intentionally obscure their true mental state from it.

[commakozzi]

I agree with you, and i would add that morals are not objective but rather subjective, which you alluded to by identifying a moral subject. Therefore, if you believe that lying is immoral, it does not matter if you're lying to another person, yourself, or to an inanimate object.

[anonymous_sorry]

So for me, it's not about being reductionist, but about not anthropomorphizing or using words which which may suggest an inappropriate ethical or moral dimension to interactions with a piece of software.

[lxgr]

I'm the last to stand in the way of more precise terminology! Any ideas for "lying to a moral non-entity"? :)

“Lying” traditionally requires only belief capacity on the receiver’s side, not qualia/subjective experiences. In other words, it makes sense to talk about lying even to p-zombies.

I think it does make sense to attribute some belief capacity to (the entity role-played by) an advanced LLM.

[anonymous_sorry]

I think just be specific - a suicidal sixteen year-old was able to discuss methods of killing himself with an LLM by prompting it to role-play a fictional scenario.

No need to say he "lied" and then use an analogy of him lying to a human being, as did the comment I originally objected to.