[abxyz]

> I can't, however, provide any 2FA codes or backup codes because they are printed on paper that has, I assume, been destroyed.

The situation you are in is very unfortunate and I am sympathetic but in GitHub's defence, this is exactly what I hope would happen when I enable 2FA. I would be very perturbed to find out that GitHub would grant access to my account given identity documents. There are some creative solutions (e.g: a countdown to the reset with progressively more aggressive email notifications to ensure the account holder is aware) but even they are problematic. So, this sucks, but it's the price we pay for security.

[joshmn]

That's the same stance I have and why I'm torn. The little quirk here—where it makes slightly more sense—is that they received a legal notice at one point (from the US Government) about my account, there are plenty of online articles to corroborate me as me, and I have a fancy prison release ID that can help me identify me. Unfortunately this context is probably lost on the individuals who work their Zendesk.

The policies are rather draconian as others have mentioned. Anyone could be the victim of theft; mine just has an awkward paper trail attached to it.

[abxyz]

I think the disconnect between you and GitHub support is that you're positioning this as a problem of proving your identity whereas for GitHub support it is a policy. The GitHub policy is: you lose your 2FA, you lose your account. Verifying your identity is not relevant. GitHub provides extensive tooling to protect your account (multiple methods of 2FA, recovery codes etc.) and so from their perspective, while this is deeply unfortunate, the policy is very clear and allowing you access to the account would be a major security issue (not for your account specifically, but for GitHub as an organization).

edit: https://docs.github.com/en/site-policy/other-site-policies/g...

[ryandrake]

These (for good reason) draconian policies are the reason I am still hesitant to embrace 2FA. I understand the significant improvement in your security posture, and I would not want someone not-me to be able to reset my credentials. But the failure mode is just too catastrophic. You lose one thing and you are shit out of luck.

We need something better. I don't know what it would be.

[cxr]

> We need something better. I don't know what it would be.

Choosing a long, very secure password for your account works really, really well. GitHub hates this, however, and nudges toward less secure practices that are more likely to result in the sorts of compromises described in this thread.

[alwa]

I for one would appreciate the option to put an ID on file ahead of time, at least for important stuff like this. I like digital-only accounts for play, but for work stuff with real-world consequence, I’d like to link it to a real-world identity system…

Not unlike the signature cards banks used long ago, I guess.

Sure, maybe somebody motivated could defraud the government into issuing them a replacement ID in my name. But that’s big boy crime, not a casual “bribe a retail employee to SIM swap” kind of undertaking.

Sure, there are issues of access to government ID systems, and I know anything touching government names / “show me your papers” raises hackers’ hackles—I’m not saying require it, just that I’d choose it if it were a MFA option of last resort.

[eterm]

That's how you turn 2fa into single factor authentication ( The ID ).

GitHub is such a large attack vector for the whole planet, that I understand their stance.

GitHub support a "recovery code" more secure than government ID. Print it out, store on USB, store on QR, etc, and stick it in at least one secure safe.

[nerdsniper]

The issue is less about having an ID on file, and more about verifying ID. In a world of excellent real-time deepfakes, how would GitHub verify ID at scale?

A fake ID is pretty easy to create, along with a fake face for a video chat where you can hold up your fake ID.

[alwa]

I think that part is made easier by the fact that I uploaded the ID in the first place under fully trusted conditions.

If I have the same physical piece of ID—as I imagine OP might have, upon release from prison—then they can directly compare it to the copy that I supplied previously. Scuff marks and specific document numbers included. I think that probably even scales.

If I lose access to my main identity document, one advantage of government ID is that I’ll urgently have it reissued. In most of the places I’ve lived, that’s the kind of thing you can validate against either the underlying authority or a sleazy-but-reasonably-accurate data broker. But in either case it’s out-of-band from my relationship with the tech company, in a way they can validate by semi- or fully-automated means, and with reference to an independent authority.

If somebody wants to physically mug me to steal my ID for access to my GitHub, I figure I’m pretty much out of luck—to paraphrase James Mickens [0], Mossad’s gonna Mossad.

[0] https://www.usenix.org/system/files/1401_08-12_mickens.pdf

[true_religion]

You don't have to do things "at scale". Github could require a substantial financial transaction to cover all the costs associated with ID verification and account re-instatement, as well as keep backups before that point so if it's proven after the fact that it was fraud, they could restore to the original state.

Like my data center (not US based) has a process where if you lose all of the documentation proving that a server is yours, you can go on site physically with ID, and the police and/or national identity service will verify on the spot that your finger prints match what is on file for the ID. It costs something like $300 and you risk being arrested if you're a criminal.

[filearts]

An idea might be to require a financially meaningful deposit to pursue an account recovery like this. The deposit would be forfeit if the identity verification failed.

Though now that I write this, it creates a perverse incentive for a company to collect deposits and deny account recovery.

[joshmn]

> I for one would appreciate the option to put an ID on file ahead of time, at least for important stuff like this.

I'm at that point of agreement. I don't want to say "national SSO ID" because that can get really Orwellian obviously. Being able to put an ID on file is a reasonable ask.

[em-bee]

a passport is orwellian? i don't really get this fear of government issued IDs. if your government is so bad that it will abuse IDs for surveillance, then your government is the problem, and not having a national ID is not going to protect you.

[saint_yossarian]

You can use a TOTP authenticator with backup support (I use Aegis on Android, and less critical ones in Bitwarden), and backup your recovery codes.

[michaelmior]

Part of the problem here is that there is no prior association of an identity with an account. So proving who you are is somewhat irrelevant since even if the account has your name, email, and photo, that's no guarantee that the account was created by you. If identity verification were required ahead of time, then perhaps verifying identity after loss of access could be reasonable recovery method. But of course there are many reasons why requiring such verification is problematic.

[TheGuineaGhost]

They are so in love with their policies, how about a policy for something better than 2FA for this possibility? Like pay $10,000, go to their headquarters in person with a lawyer and all your documents and have a "hearing" of some kind. This is even better than 2FA, call it 20FA if it makes them feel good about it! Someone in this unique situation needs a unique way to solve the issue. If I lost all of my documents in a fire, I could still get my life back together and be able to fly on airplanes again. So, there is a way to do this, even if it is extreme, if people would care and stop hiding behind paperwork and bureaucracy. Yeah, maybe they would lose some of their time they spend talking or surfing the web at their desk, but it would greatly help someone with a legitimate need that can be proven.

[amatecha]

Someone high enough in the food chain at GitHub can override that policy at their whim. I have personally had my day saved by that very "loophole" in another "lost access to an online service" situation in the past.

[MrGilbert]

I'd assume that there is simply no "ok, this individual got released from prison and can proof everything" policy in place, and that might be the real issue here. Big organizations begin to tumble once you request something where there are no policies in place.

[werkwolk]

Why do I feel most of this is ai created text...whoever is posting will probably adjust their prompt, but who uses '-' mid text?

[lkirkwood]

I find this infuriating. I get absolutely no sense that this is AI, and this bizarre attitude towards em dashes is nonsense. Loads of people use them, especially in less formal writing. Get over it.

[bruce511]

I do.

[hluska]

I’m not sure that blaming tech support for not understanding context is the best approach here. The other sides of that context, which are understandable from their point of view, is that you were charged with some serious crimes. There’s a large delta between the charges and the conviction, but you’ve got some scary words written about you online. Secondarily, GitHub has policy so whereas you’re coming at it from a position of being correct, they’re in a position where they have to break policy. That’s a big risk.

Your best bet would likely be legal. US Federal law imposes some strict rules on lawyers for identity verification to combat money laundering so attorneys have a legally recognized toolkit to verify identity. Having a third party who works for you in the mix could help. Though again, it would involve breaking their policy so this would be a decision made several layers above Zendesk access.

Otherwise, I think this is doing precisely what 2FA is meant to do. It’s not okay for you and you’ve clearly lost a lot because of this, but with the current threat environment, GitHub has to be very careful especially with 2FA. From their point of view, there likely isn’t that big of a gap between your interactions and interactions with people who are trying to take over accounts. A lawyer may not work, but it sure changes that equation.

[zerr]

The person should be able to walk in the service provider's office and get an in-person help, restoration of access, by presenting ID docs.

[paulcole]

If you are not European, I will be amazed.

If you set up 2FA and then lose your 2FA, then that’s just life. Happens sometimes and you move on. GitHub absolutely doesn’t need to provide an in-person recovery service.

[kulahan]

Not to mention I’m pretty sure their only physical location you can walk into is in Seattle? Maybe SF?

[kramer2718]

I agree that simply emailing in copies of identity documents after the fact shouldn't be sufficient. However, there should be a verification process that includes verification of identity documents through legal means, including perhaps a processing fee. The fee would preclude many attackers from even trying to break this process.

Maybe this would only work for new accounts as you'd probably need to provide identity information on before losing access.

[Retr0id]

As a matter of policy, sure. But at the same time, I bet there are some GitHub employees reading this that would be in a position to pull some strings and make an exception. For OP's sake, I hope I'm right!

[randunel]

Social engineering attacks are a thing, you know...

[DengistKhan]

Also could be a honeypot.

[Retr0id]

I'm aware.