[iamnothere]

Even mass deanonymization—which is unlikely to be sustainable long-term in such an adversarial ecosystem—does nothing for you unless you (a) know specifically what you are looking for and (b) are able to either compromise the end server or identify frequent or very large transfers that correspond exactly with known events or data of interest (like specific uploads). There are some countries where the authorities might be allowed to round up anyone who has connected to a server without further information about what they were doing, but despite our declining civil liberties situation, these countries aren’t currently in the West.

There just aren’t that many people who are both legitimate and likely targets of such an attack. And since the most likely actor to be able to afford such an attack (USG) also has practical uses for Tor, IMHO it would be unlikely to do anything that actually threatens the network. I could be misremembering, but I believe the one big successful deanonymization attack was in Europe, not the US, and the approach used there would not have worked to locate an occasional end user of a busy server.

I am not really interested in debating this further. Feel free to respond of course, but it’s obvious to me (and hopefully everyone else) that you have an axe to grind against Tor.