[array_key_first]

I think a lot of those criminals use clear text channels because it works. If it no longer works, then they move.

Meaning, chat control might pressure criminals. For a bit. Until they wisen up and use more secure protocols and end points.

Which, not only exist, but are very easy to use and wide spread.

[amarant]

How hard would it be for law enforcement today, before chat control, to get chat logs out of discord?

Discord isn't exactly known for it's privacy features, still I imagine there's some challenge?

If the effort is low, and they're not doing it today, they're not going to do it after chat control either.

[array_key_first]

> How hard would it be for law enforcement today, before chat control, to get chat logs out of discord?

Not sure, speculating: somewhat hard.

Discord must comply with government subpoenas, so if you're the FBI it's easy. If you're law enforcement, I imagine they tell you to go kick rocks if you don't have a warrant.

Law enforcement is pretty bad and mostly lazy. They can't be bothered to pull people over going 20 over, let alone get a warrant for every wannabe punk.

If you're not in the US, then I imagine the effort is insurmountable.

> If the effort is low, and they're not doing it today, they're not going to do it after chat control either.

No - but it can be automated, which is the issue.

Sort of like how the US was wire tapping virtually all internet traffic at one point with PRISM.

Then I imagine the "law enforcement" is done using machine learning and heauristics.

Do you use black slang? Put him on the list. Is your name not that white sounding? That's right, the list. Are you on hacker news? You guessed it - the list.

I mean, that's pretty much how automated facial detection works now. And yeah, it sucks.

[spwa4]

> If you're not in the US, then I imagine the effort is insurmountable.

Actually, in the EU, the police (and ...) have direct access to surveillance channels. Meaning, they have a website interface that they click around on, without anyone from the provider ever helping them at all. This allows for extracting call logs, listening in, finding location, lists of IPs they connected with, what DNS records they looked up (yes, that part is defeated by actually configuring DNS in your phone, but who does that?), ... I've seen these interfaces because I've designed their network installation and a bit of initial support. They are installed on cell towers. Oh and "support" meant getting calls from all sorts of local police stations who found out this was possible and essentially directing them to the person who could give them access.

Of course, the spying equipment itself does not log who access it and what they access. Clearly, the police do not need to be told what the value is of hiding what you're doing even if it's legal.

The only issue holding back mass-surveillance in the EU is "who pays for it?". Essentially a number of hours are tracked? Why so little? Then the local SSD is full. They want 6 months, minimum, but the state is unwilling to pay a single cent for that, and forcing providers to pay for it, that the executive (ie. ministers) haven't been willing to do.

Yes, they're supposed to get a "research judge" permission, which is more-or-less a subpoena, except much more informal, but do they actually do this? It's an honor system.